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INTRODUCTION

The evaluation of relationships between actors is an important
preoccupation across many areas of law.1 The nature of such relationships
and the extent to which they are respected under the law can give rise to
significant legal consequences.2 No less so in tax law. Relationships,
interactions, and transactions between taxpayers and other parties are
critical in allowing taxpayers to obtain desired tax results.3
Correspondingly, where the tax law refuses to respect such relationships,
adverse tax consequences follow.4
Relationships, interactions, and transactions between players are
nowhere more critical than in situations involving transactions deliberately
entered into to avoid paying taxes, commonly referred to as tax shelter
transactions.5 Shelter transactions represent instances of exceptionally
1. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J.
226 (1921) (presenting a theory of jural relations and of law that underlies current judicial
reasoning); Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (mapping legal interests accompanying various jural
interests and relations).
2. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race
to Explain Why „Separate‟ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never be
„Equal‟ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1191-1205 (2009) (describing consequences of separately
defined relationship statuses in family law); Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How
Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (describing
detrimental effects of relationships created through securitization).
3. See generally Comm‘r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (early cases setting out income realization requirement).
4. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (related party attribution rules); I.R.C. § 318 (2006)
(rules for constructive ownership of stock).
5. In order to further discussion, this Article uses the terms ―tax shelter‖ or ―aggressive
tax planning‖ broadly, to include transactions entered into to avoid taxes, whether they
actually have been determined to cross the line between acceptable and unacceptable tax
planning. The term is not used in a statutory or technical sense to denote actual litigation
outcomes. Contra I.R.C. § 6700 (2006) (defining ―tax shelters‖ for the purpose of imposing
monetary penalty); I.R.C. § 7408 (2006) (authorizing injunctions against conduct relating to
tax shelters). Of course, the academic literature itself evinces a lack of agreement with
respect to even the threshold question of what a tax shelter really is. See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF
THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/taxpolicy/library/ctswhite.pdf (setting out common characteristics of corporate tax shelters);
Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword: Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters Part I, 55 TAX L.
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aggressive relationship formation, and in many shelter transactions one
sees taxpayers purposefully creating and entering into contracts and
relationships with tax-exempt entities, tax-indifferent foreign entities,
insurance companies, banks, and other entities in order to generate
favorable tax consequences.6 Sometimes courts respect these purposefully
formed relationships and transactions and sanction their tax-minimization
endeavors.7 Other times, they are not given weight.8 In order to distinguish
between those transactions and relationships that deserve respect and those
that do not, tax law has developed significant doctrines that inquire into the
―substance,‖ ―risk,‖ or ―purpose‖ of such transactions and relationships.
These judicially originated ―anti-abuse‖ doctrines include the substanceover-form doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, the business purpose
doctrine, and, perhaps most prominently, the recently codified economic
substance doctrine.9
This Article argues that the tax law‘s traditional focus on whether a
transaction holds enough ―risk‖ or ―economic substance‖ to be respected is
insufficient in meeting the full range of challenges presented by the
sophisticated, interlocking, and often hidden relationships that underlie tax
planning today. It argues that the fundamentally relational character of tax
planning has important impacts on the shape and outcome of tax shelter
REV. 125 (2002) (comparing James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old
“Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 158-59 (2002), with David P. Hariton,
Response to “Old „Brine‟ in New Bottles” (New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397,
399 (2002) (construing Eustice, supra note 5)). At the same time, it is clear that those
transactions that cross the line (as well as some that come close but do not) are viewed by
many as problematic, revenue-reducing, and unfair. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002) (―[T]ax planning, all tax
planning, not just planning associated with traditional notions of shelters, produces nothing
of value.‖). But see Leo Katz, In Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799 (2007)
(defending tax shelters by analogy to agenda manipulation).
6. See cases cited infra notes 7 and 8 (examples of tax shelter cases decided by courts).
Thus, tax shelter transactions represent the extreme end of a continuum. While this Article
focuses on this extreme case, much of the relational analysis set forth herein is also
applicable to non-shelter tax transactions.
7. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md.
2004), aff‟d in part, rev‟d in part and remanded by 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer under the sham transaction
doctrine); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001)
(reversing tax court and holding for taxpayer); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States,
90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (holding that a ―lease-in, lease-out‖ transaction qualified for rental,
interest, and transaction cost deductions).
8. See, e.g., ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (determining
partnership transaction did not have sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax
purposes); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010) (concluding ―sale-in,
lease-out‖ transaction lacked objective economic substance).
9. In this Article, the term ―judicial anti-abuse doctrines‖ includes the recently
codified economic substance doctrine.
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litigation beyond the question of whether a transaction or relationship has
―substance.‖ In trying to understand the full range of impacts of
relationships and interactivity between taxpayers and other parties in how
tax shelter cases get litigated, this Article‘s normative critique and
proposed solutions build upon the emerging body of literature that pays
explicit attention to the relational underpinnings of tax transactions.10
Given the pervasive and growing importance of relationships with
facilitative, friendly, and accommodating third parties in tax shelter
transactions, explicit probing of the full significance of these parties in
determining outcomes in shelter cases has been surprisingly sparse.11
There has been a good deal of commentary on the adequacy of judicially
applied anti-abuse doctrines in addressing the tax shelter problem, and
some of this commentary, of course, implicitly addresses the more obvious
aspects of how relationships and transactions with third parties come into
play in determining whether a transaction is an abusive tax shelter.12
10. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697-700 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman I] (arguing
that substantive federal tax law can be improved by increased use of ―structural constraints‖
in situations where third parties have an incentive to collude with taxpayers in promoting
noncompliance); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning] (discussing
informal agreements between taxpayers and counterparties designed to eliminate market risk
by substituting for it a different kind of relational risk and suggesting reforms to address the
problem of what the author calls ―relational tax planning‖); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of
Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (2007) [hereinafter
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms] (addressing the unintentional tax benefits stemming from
informal transactions based on tacit understandings between players); Jay A. Soled, ThirdParty Civil Tax Penalties and Professional Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611 (2004)
(evaluating third-party tax penalties and professional standards and suggesting reforms that
emphasize accountability of both third parties and tax professionals). See also U.S. GOV‘T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-968, TAX GAP: IRS CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
TAX EVASION BY NETWORKS OF BUSINESSES AND RELATED ENTITIES (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10968.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON NETWORK TAX
EVASION] (discussing effects of networks of related entities in facilitating tax evasion).
11. But see sources cited supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005) (suggesting a new approach to
the tax shelter problem, based on the general disallowance of noneconomic losses);
Amandeep S. Grewal, Economic Substance and the Supreme Court, 116 TAX NOTES 969,
970 (2007) (arguing that the lower court‘s application of the economic substance doctrine
cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent and is inconsistent with rules of
statutory interpretation); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 389 (2010) (arguing that economic substance doctrine should be replaced by inquiry
into congressional intent); Assaf Likhovski, The Story of Gregory: How are Tax Avoidance
Cases Decided?, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 89-132, (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Start eds.,
2005) (using the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in the landmark tax case Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935), as a backdrop for discussing how courts address matters of tax
avoidance); Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 783, 784-85 (2008) (focusing on the problems caused by the economic substance
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However, the powerful and perverting effects of third-party relationships
on judicial applications of existing anti-abuse doctrines beyond the
question of risk or substance have received less attention in the literature.13
The failure of the tax literature to deeply explore and theorize third-party
relationships stands in marked contrast to other areas of law, where
relationships between legal persons have been subject to intense, even
voyeuristic, scrutiny.14 This gap in the tax literature is especially
problematic because relationships and interactions underlying sophisticated
shelter transactions tend to be complex, non-intuitive, hidden from lay
view, and difficult to understand.
One possible reason for this gap is that, judicial anti-abuse doctrines
aside, discourses that emphasize the content of our substantive tax rules as
discrete phenomena have been privileged over discourses analyzing the
underlying relationships and interactions between taxpayers and third
parties that facilitate the abuse of these rules. More public light needs to be
shed upon the deeply transactional nature of the tax rules in order to
remedy this imbalance so that all of the effects of transactional tax
relationships receive scrutiny commensurate with their importance and
commensurate with the attention received by relationships in other areas of
law. This Article argues that the best ways to shed such light are (1) to
encourage explicit judicial narratives about relationships in tax planning in
order to facilitate transparency and counteract the dominating effects of
rules-based and sanctions-based discourses,15 and (2) to adequately police
doctrine‘s reliance on pretax analysis and proposing new framework for testing objective
economic substance); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory
Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697 (2009)
(arguing that judicial anti-abuse tests are insufficient and putting forth a test that looks
directly at the purposes of the relevant laws); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of
Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88 (2002) (analyzing the effects of
the business purpose doctrine and the economic substance doctrine ―as changes to the
marginal elasticity of taxable income‖). Of course, the economic substance doctrine has
now been codified in statutory form. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2010).
13. But see supra note 10 and accompanying text (examining examples of articles in
which these matters have been discussed).
14. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003)
(stating that ―[i]n a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing
spouses and an approving State . . . . While only the parties can mutually assent to marriage,
the terms of the marriage—who may marry and what obligations, benefits, and liabilities
attach to civil marriage—are set by the Commonwealth.‖).
15. ―Rules-based‖ refers to accounts that focus on the content of the substantive tax
rules and how to prevent their abuse. See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying
text (providing examples of literature discussing abuse prevention strategy utilizing broadly
rules-based approaches). ―Sanctions-based‖ denotes the tax literature focusing on the
importance of disclosure, reporting, public shaming, and penalties as means to curb abusive
tax shelter transactions. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward
Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009) (proposing that overdisclosure under
current tax shelter disclosure law should be countered proactively by penalties and other
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the boundaries of important judicial doctrines from the warping effects of
aggressive relationship formation. Accordingly, this Article offers two
proposals designed to achieve these goals.16
Part II lays a descriptive, analytical foundation for understanding the
roles and significance of third-party relationships in tax planning. First, it
defines and explains the parameters of what this Article means when it
talks about ―relationships,‖ ―transactions,‖ and ―third parties.‖ Next, it
describes in detail some of the roles that relationships with third parties
play in tax planning, and in particular, in tax shelter transactions.17 This
description seeks to broadly emphasize the transactional-relational quality
of tax planning for the non-tax reader; it is also an explicit attempt to raise
consciousness about the presence of the aggressive and sophisticated, yet
often hidden, relationships that underlie tax planning.18 Finally, Part II
points to a number of ―form-friendly‖ features of tax law that have
encouraged and facilitated increasing participation of third parties over
time and that have made it more difficult to adequately evaluate their
participation.19 Part III discusses the ultimate inadequacy of traditional
means); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 863 (2004) (analyzing the effects, function, and symbolism of alternative sanctions
imposed by Congress on taxpayers who take advantage of the Internal Revenue Code);
Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter
Lederman II] (finding that some taxpayer information reporting laws and proposals are more
effective than others in improving compliance).
16. The analysis set forth in this Article is applicable to those tax shelter cases that
involve third parties such as lease stripping cases, equipment leasing transactions, and
others. See, e.g., AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D.
Ohio 2008) (sale-in/lease-out transaction); CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm‘r, T.C.M. (RIA)
2005-16 (2005) (multiparty lease stripping transaction).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. I am deliberately borrowing the term ―consciousness raising‖ as used in critical
scholarship. Part of the project of this Article is to raise consciousness about the central role
of aggressive relationality in enabling abusive tax planning, so that such relationality gets as
much scholarly and critical exposure as relationships in other areas of law, such as family
law. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1784-87 (2003) (discussing functions of narrative in
critical race theory); Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of
the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN‘S L.J. 569, 583
(2010) (discussing use of narrative as a ―tool of consciousness-raising‖ in the construction
of corporate law and governance); Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of
Narrative in Corporate Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 541 (2007) (concluding that using
narrative to reform corporate law is not ―fruitful‖ because corporate law is abstract in
nature); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (2010) (―The term [consciousness raising] and the activity
took seriously the psychological concept of repression wherein something that is hidden
from consciousness could and should be brought to light by talking about it.‖).
19. See infra Part II.B.
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analyses of ―risk‖ or ―substance‖ in evaluating the full effects of
relationality in tax planning transactions. First, it provides a brief summary
of the traditional judicial doctrines commonly applied in shelter cases (such
as the economic substance doctrine) and explains how these doctrines are,
at their core, concerned with relationship analysis.20 It then demonstrates
that while many courts do implicitly or explicitly evaluate relationships as
part of applying these doctrines, certain features of tax law‘s development
have, in effect, inhibited the efficacy of the traditional doctrines in
assessing and evaluating third-party transactions and relationships. As
such, there remain areas in which such judicial evaluations of relationships
can be improved, both in content and in expression.21 Part IV identifies
two additional important impacts of third-party relationships and
participation in the litigation of tax shelter transactions, namely, adverse
impacts on transparency and observability, and obfuscatory impacts on the
actual substantive content of judicial doctrine. Finally, Part V sets forth
two normative proposals to mitigate the harmful effects associated with
third-party relationships that have been identified in this Article: (1)
judicial application of a rigorously implemented and clearly expressed
―oppositional-choice‖ analysis, and (2) judicial rehabilitation of the
business purpose doctrine from the confusion caused by increasing (and
increasingly complex) taxpayer relationships. The proposals set forth in
this Article are designed (1) to encourage more consistent and accurate
judicial determinations of when and whether to respect relationships
between taxpayers and third parties, (2) to raise awareness about the
importance of third parties in tax planning by encouraging explicit and
transparent judicial and litigant narratives about such relationships, (3) to
encourage fairer and more consistent outcomes in tax shelter litigation, and
4) to discourage taxpayers from engaging in the aggressive formation of
relationships that serve only to drain the fisc.
At the core, the central issue addressed in this Article—that is, the
question of how to identify, understand, and manage the hidden effects and
consequences of relationship creation between legal persons, both humans
and non-humans—is not a problem confined to tax law. Rather, it is a
concern that pervades many other areas of law, including bankruptcy,
securities, family, immigration, commercial, and corporate law.22 The ease
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
22. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the
Federal Securities Laws, 17 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 215 (2002) (looking at the role of
relationships in securities law); Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation,
and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611 (2008) (discussing liability under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) of ―collateral‖ third parties that aid and abet securities fraud);
see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding that a
corporation‘s vendors and customers could not be liable as primary actors for purposes of
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and speed with which contemporary commercial and other relationships are
formed, with or without underlying substance, and the potentially
detrimental effects of such relationship formation, make it a question of
particular urgency today.
II.

THE ROLE OF RELATIONSHIPS IN TAX SHELTER CASES

Before venturing further, it is important to define what this Article
means in speaking about ―third parties,‖ ―relationships,‖ and
―transactions.‖ This Article uses the term ―third parties‖ generally to mean
persons separate from the taxpayer.23 What does it mean for a person to be
―separate‖ from the taxpayer? To take an easy baseline, the Internal
Revenue Code (the ―Code‖) contains provisions that disallow tax
consequences generated by certain transactions between ―related‖ parties,
or that attribute ownership to or from one person based on a relationship
with another person.24 This Article is primarily concerned with those
relationships between parties not already explicitly covered by the Code
attribution rules. Loosely speaking, this means non-taxpayer parties whose
transactional consequences have not been specifically disallowed by
application of such related-party statutory provisions but whose
interactions may present problems nonetheless.25 Of course, some such
―third parties‖ may be ―more unrelated‖ to the taxpayer than others, and the
boundaries between related and unrelated parties are not always entirely
clear. For example, if an individual taxpayer holds significant shares in a
corporation, and that corporation does business with another corporation in
which that individual taxpayer also holds shares, the two corporations
would be ―third parties‖ under this Article‘s rubric, even though there is

investor‘s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) securities fraud action, notwithstanding
their deceptive conduct); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (U.S.A.), Inc.,
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding Merrill Lynch not liable for aiding and abetting Enron
by buying Nigerian barges to allow Enron to book millions in earnings and cash flow on
Enron‘s promise to repurchase).
23. The term ―third party,‖ of course, begs the question of who the ―second party‖ is.
In this Article‘s parlance, the ―second party‖ is the IRS, who the taxpayer faces in litigation.
Non-taxpayer counterparties are hence ―third parties‖ in the sense that they are players other
than the taxpayer and the IRS.
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (denying deductions for losses from sales of property
between certain ―related‖ persons, including siblings, parents and their children, and
individuals and corporations more than 50% of whose stock (by value) is owned by such
individual); I.R.C. § 318 (2006) (rules for constructive ownership of stock).
25. Of course, a relationship may be ―disrespected‖ for the purposes of one section of
the I.R.C. but not for purposes of another. Compare I.R.C. § 318 (2006), with I.R.C. § 544
(2006) (both setting out rules for determining stock ownership). See also Glenn E. Coven,
The Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45
TENN. L. REV. 557 (1978) (studying the complexities of the attribution rules of the tax code).
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some relationship between them. Thus, this Article uses the term ―third
parties‖ somewhat heuristically, rather than strictly definitionally, to denote
the broad universe of non-taxpayer parties with whom the taxpayer
transacts.
This Article uses the term ―transactions‖ to refer to the discrete
agreements and contracts entered into between the contracting parties.
Correspondingly, it uses the term ―relationships‖ more broadly to include
both discrete transactions (if any) and the larger relational context
underlying such discrete transactions. In other words, the ―relationship‖
between the parties includes both the actual agreements, contracts, and
deals (if any) entered into between them as well as intangibles such as:
 relational statuses existing outside of the transaction
(such as ―friend,‖ ―colleague,‖ ―relative,‖ ―employer,‖ or
―prospective client‖);
 legal statuses existing outside of or taken on as a result of
the transaction (such as ―ex-husband‖ and ―ex-wife,‖
―buyer‖ and ―seller,‖ or ―lessor and lessee‖); and
 the ongoing responses, emotions, incentives, behaviors,
and actions of the parties toward one another over time
as a result of prospective, one-time or ongoing dealings.
Thus, the concept of relationships and relationality used in this Article
encompasses formalized legal relationships but is also supra-legal. It
reflects the notion that legal transactions entered into between parties
contribute to, and are part of, the ―relationship‖ that exists between them
but that such ―relationship‖ is more than just the sum total of the extant
legal contracts.
Having defined its key terminology, the remainder of this section
describes—for the non-tax specialist but also as a deliberate reminder to the
tax specialist—the roles and significance of third parties in tax shelter
transactions. First, it broadly outlines the functions performed by third
parties in tax planning transactions and describes the evolution of such
third-party participation. It then describes some features of tax law that
facilitate and encourage increasing third-party involvement, and argues that
the growing involvement of third parties makes it all the more urgent that
third-party relationships be scrutinized and evaluated in a systematic way
that goes beyond current doctrine.
A.

The Roles Played by Third-Party Relationships in Shelter Cases

It is no secret that transactions between taxpayers and third parties are
essential in triggering tax consequences.26 This is true not just in shelter
26. See Comm‘r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (setting forth the realization
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cases but throughout tax law.27 In most cases, it is a transaction or
agreement between two or more parties that leads to tax consequences.28
For example, where an employee is paid a wage by her employer, it is the
act of the employer‘s payment to the employee that triggers tax realization
and the gross income inclusion.29 On the other hand, imputed income30 has
not historically been subject to federal income tax.31 The exclusion of
imputed income may be explained on adminstrability, compliance, or
critical grounds;32 it can also be explained by the non-interactive or nonrelational character of imputed income payments, particularly as compared
to the (taxable) treatment of barter transactions.33 In other words, barter
exchanges, which are interactive transactions between two parties, are
taxable; imputed income, which lacks this relationally generated character,
is not.34 This transactional-relational character of tax law is a highly
important feature, one that should be obvious but is often left
requirement); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (giving weight to the element of
severability for income realization).
27. As previously noted, abusive shelter transactions merely represent particularly
egregious applications of such relationality.
28. See MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 75 (11th ed. 2009)
(―[B]ecause the realization requirement exists, the income tax is a tax on transactions
instead of being a tax on income in the economic sense.‖). But see Cesarini v. United
States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (finding cash in a piano seven years after it was
purchased did not require another party‘s participation to generate income).
29. I.R.C. § 61 (2006).
30. Imputed income is income that may be ―imputed‖ to a person due to her
consumption of goods and services for which she does not receive actual payments.
Common examples include imputed rent for the consumption of one‘s personal residence,
and imputed service income for household chores performed.
31. Benjamin v. Hoey, 139 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that, when a stockbroker
paid commissions into a partnership on transactions for his own account, the share of those
commissions payable to him as a partner did not count as income); Morris v. Comm‘r, 9
B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (holding that a taxpayer‘s imputed income from the portion of the
building it used itself rather than renting was not subject to tax and adding that ―[i]t is
obvious that [the farmer‘s produce is] comparable to the rental value of a private residence,
which has never been regarded as income or as a factor in the determination of tax
liability‖).
32. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573-74 (1996) (―A
recognition of the importance of women‘s work, regardless of the setting, would more
accurately reflect women‘s valuable contributions to the economy. Once formally
recognized, society is likely to value nonmarket housework activities similarly to market
activities, thereby entitling women to social welfare benefits that are currently tied only to
waged labor in the market.‖).
33. Compare Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (barter income is included in gross
income), with Morris, 9 B.T.A. 1273 and Benjamin, 139 F.2d 945. See also supra notes 3031 and accompanying text; cf. Lederman I, supra note 10 (discussing roles third parties play
in helping with ―verifiability‖ and ―enforceability‖).
34. Mere ―imputed income‖ has not historically been taxed, and precedent suggests it
could not be taxed. BURKE & FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME, at 30 (8th ed. 2007);
see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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unmentioned.35
The fact that, most often, it is a transaction between two separate
persons that triggers tax consequences means that the actions and existence
of third parties are tremendously important in generating said tax
consequences. This is the case both in the non-shelter context as well as in
cases involving abusive tax planning (the role played by third parties in
abusive tax shelter cases being simply an exceptionally aggressive
extension of the usual role of such parties in generating tax consequences).
Yet the discourses of tax law and tax shelter cases tend to focus on the
substantive content of the statutory provisions allowing such transactions,
often at the expense of scrutinizing the underlying roles of third-party
players that allow the transactions to happen in the first place.36
In fact, third parties play vital roles in generating tax consequences.37
These roles can be broken down into three overlapping functions: a
realization function, a financing function, and a stripping/diversion
function. While third parties play other roles in shelter cases, these three
roles make up the majority of the functions that third parties play.38
1.

The Realization (or Timing) Function

It is well known that the realization requirement is one of the most
central concepts in tax law.39 Simply put, the realization requirement, the
35. But see Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1735, 1738-39 (pointing out that asymmetric
information between government and taxpayer is a ―core problem‖ for tax enforcement, and
discussing the effectiveness of information reporting by third parties in narrowing the tax
gap); Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1199-1201 (examining how
individuals use ―relational tax planning‖ to avoid adverse tax consequences); Raskolnikov,
The Cost of Norms, supra note 10, at 642 (addressing efficiency costs of informal
arrangements in interactions between taxpayers).
36. For example, much of the literature concerns itself with the proper statutory
interpretation of tax provisions in the face of abusive transactions that fit within the literal
terms of those provisions. E.g., Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Steven Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters
and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007);
McCormack, supra note 12, at 703, 706-07. But see sources cited supra note 10.
37. Not all shelter transactions involve the aggressive participation of third parties and
this Article does not so claim. For example, some avoidance transactions may take place
between taxpayers and entities wholly owned by the taxpayers. Such a transaction is not a
transaction with a ―third party‖ in the same sense as a tax planning transaction with an
unrelated actor. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (discussing deduction of
loss for sale of securities to corporation wholly owned by taxpayer).
38. For example, the participation of third parties may also enable taxpayers to convert
ordinary income into capital gain or vice versa, thereby performing a transformation
function. E.g., TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980);
Mayer v. United States, 285 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1960); Glass v. Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 1087
(1986).
39. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (early case delineating types of possible
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meaning of which is hard to pin down, generally requires some kind of
event or transaction in order to trigger the income inclusion, loss
deductibility, or other tax consequences.40 It is a fundamental tenet of tax
law that appreciation, accretion, or decline in value, without more, will not
generally trigger tax consequences.41 For example, if an individual owns a
painting purchased for $200 in 2001, and the painting increases in value to
$2,000 in 2010, the individual will not be taxed on the $1,800 appreciation
absent a sale, exchange, or other disposition of the painting.42 Such
disposition in effect provides the ―realization‖ required in order to trigger
the tax consequences.43
Third parties are instrumental in determining the timing of the
realization event that is required to trigger tax consequences or benefits. In
the above example, the individual would need to sell the painting to a buyer
in order to trigger income inclusion in a given tax year—she can hardly sell
the painting to herself. The Code also contains rules that apply in various
situations to circumscribe the tax consequences of transactions between
certain parties considered by the tax law to be insufficiently separate from
the taxpayer.44 Thus, the tax law in effect imposes an unspoken
requirement that the taxpayer must generally transact or interact with a
sufficiently separate ―other‖ person in order to trigger the taxable event.45
This transactional or interactive function of third parties in providing
the realization event required to trigger tax consequences is clearly
observed in tax shelter cases. In cases as early as the Supreme Court‘s
1935 decision in Gregory v. Helvering, taxpayers have attempted to use
persons ―separate‖ from themselves to enter into transactions that trigger
favorable tax consequences.46 In today‘s transactions, the rather blatant use
realization events); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 209, 211-12, 214 (holding that a dividend in the form
of additional stock is not a realized gain for tax purposes).
40. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 28, at 73-75 (―Our tax system does not reach mere
changes in property value . . . .‖).
41. See Eustice, supra note 5, at 142 (―Taxpayers‘ ability to select which gains or losses
are to be recognized for tax purposes, and when that event is to occur, is a common theme in
many tax shelter transaction planning scenarios.‖). Of course the realization rule is not a
universal tax law tenet, and is undercut in certain circumstances by alternative timing rules,
such as the mark-to-market accounting rules. See I.R.C. § 475 (2006) (mark-to-market
accounting rules for securities dealers). Conversely, not all realization events will trigger
recognition. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 351 (2006) (general non-recognition rule for certain asset
transfers to corporations).
42. See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. E.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (disallowing deduction for losses on sale or exchange of
property between certain related taxpayers); I.R.C. § 318 (2006) (describing relationships
creating attribution in stock ownership). See also Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (discussing use
of newly incorporated corporation in transaction to reduce tax liability).
45. See generally CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 28, at 73-75.
46. 293 U.S. 465. In that case, the individual taxpayer was the sole owner of a
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of the wholly owned or controlled corporation in early cases such as
Gregory v. Helvering has in many cases been replaced by the use of
unrelated (or less obviously related) third-party intermediaries and
counterparties.47 However, the fact that these transactions are designed to
contain the ―friction‖ necessary to create realization events by involving
other ―persons‖ has remained constant. For example, in Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Commissioner and IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, cases that
involved the purchase of American Depository Receipts cum dividend and
their almost immediate sale ex dividend, the participation of third-party
sellers and buyers of the ADRs were what allowed the losses and tax
credits at issue to be generated.48 Similarly, in the consolidated optionstraddle tax shelter cases, the broker-dealers who transacted with the
taxpayers to buy or sell options allowed the ordinary losses and long-term
capital gains to be generated in the first place.49 The realization function
played by third parties can be observed in numerous other tax shelter
cases.50 In short, the realization function played by third parties in shelter
and non-shelter cases means that third-party participation significantly
impacts the timing of the income inclusion or loss generation, in the sense
that such third-party participation can determine when income is realized or
other tax consequences triggered.51
2.

The Financing Function

Another important function often played by third parties in shelter and
non-shelter cases is the financing function. The financing function
corporation (―Oldco‖), which owned securities with a built-in gain. The taxpayer
incorporated a new corporation (―Newco‖) and caused Oldco to transfer the securities to
Newco. Newco was liquidated just a few days later and distributed the securities to
taxpayer in complete liquidation. This transaction transformed what would have been
ordinary income from Oldco‘s sale of securities and distribution of proceeds into capital
gain.
47. E.g., Rice‘s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff‟d in part, rev‟d
in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
48. IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Compaq Computer Corp.
v. Comm‘r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev‟d, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
49. Glass, 87 T.C. 1087. These were cases in which the taxpayers entered into straddle
transactions for options and futures and subsequently ―closed out‖ these transactions by
buying and selling identical offsetting positions. The overall goal was to convert ordinary
income into long-term capital gains and generate ordinary losses.
50. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (involving insurance company);
Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (involving third-party banks);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 90 Fed. Cl. at 234 (use of separate phases accounting enabled
by transaction with third party changed timing of income recognition); Black & Decker, 436
F.3d 431 (involving third-party buyer of BDHMI stock).
51. See Compaq Computer Corp., 277 F.3d at 784; IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 352-56. See
also I.R.C. § 1091 (2006) (wash sale rules).
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overlaps with the realization function in the sense that both go to gain or
loss recognition. For analytical purposes, I address the financing function
separately as affecting the amount of gain or loss recognition or other tax
benefit, rather than its timing.
The amount of money or other consideration paid by the third party
in a transaction obviously has an important tax impact.52 For example, in a
basic scenario, the price paid on a sale of property to a third party in
relation to the property‘s basis will determine the amount of gain or loss to
be recognized on the transaction.53 This is, of course, no less true in tax
shelter cases.54 The magnitude of the amount paid, financed, or contributed
by a third party in a shelter transaction can cause large amounts of gain or
loss to be recognized, often in excess of true economic losses.55 For
example, in Coltec Industries v. United States, the de minimis amount paid
by third-party banks for the stock of a Coltec subsidiary in relation to the
taxpayer‘s claimed tax basis in that stock allowed the taxpayer to claim an
almost $380 million loss on the sale of those shares to the banks. 56 The
taxpayer sought to use those losses to offset approximately $241 million in
gains for that tax year and to carry forward the balance.57 Thus, the amount
―financed‖ by the third-party banks worked in conjunction with the
taxpayer‘s basis-inflation transactions among its subsidiaries to generate
the desired tax consequences (which were ultimately denied).58
Another example of a third party serving a financing function was in
the contingent installment sales (―CINS‖) shelter cases. These were cases
in which the taxpayers sought the application of the contingent installment
sales regulations to offset domestic partner capital gains.59 In the CINS
cases, the third-party foreign bank contributed millions of dollars to a
partnership in which it had partnered with a domestic corporation seeking
to offset large amounts of capital gain.60 The capital invested by the bank
was critical in allowing the partnership to make sizeable investments in
short-term private placement notes, which were then exchanged for cash
52. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (defining gross income).
53. See generally I.R.C. § 1001 (2006) (rules for determining gain or loss); I.R.C. §§
1011-12, 1016 (2006) (rules pertaining to basis of property).
54. See Black & Decker, 436 F.3d 431 (case in which taxpayer paid $561 million to
subsidiary in exchange for subsidiary‘s stock and assumption of $560 million contingent
liability, sold shares to ―unrelated‖ third-party trust benefitting former employee of taxpayer
for $1 million, and claimed $560 million capital loss).
55. See sources cited supra notes 53-54. The importance of valuation studies and
opinions in constructing shelter cases confirms this point. See I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2)(B), (b)
(2006) (penalty for gross valuation overstatements).
56. 454 F.3d at 1345.
57. Id. at 1343-45.
58. Id. at 1345.
59. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231.
60. E.g., id. at 238-39.
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and LIBOR notes to trigger the application of the ratable basis recovery
rule in the CINS Treasury regulations.61 In short, the contribution of large
amounts by the foreign partner ultimately allowed large amounts of capital
losses to be triggered, thereby achieving the desired capital gains offset
(which was disallowed).62 The foreign bank‘s role in the CINS transaction
is a prime example of the financing role played by third parties in shelter
and non-shelter tax transactions.
3.

The Stripping / Diversion Function

A third function that third parties serve is that of ―stripping‖ or
diverting certain types of tax items (and their corresponding consequences)
to those taxpayers able to absorb them at the least tax cost. A simple case
of income diversion might involve a gift of interest-bearing securities by a
parent in a higher income bracket to a child in a lower income bracket who
is likely to be taxed at a lower rate.63 Diversion of income, losses, or other
tax attributes is a widespread phenomenon in the tax shelter area and is
often performable by virtue of third-party assistance. For example, the
diversion function of third parties is observable (alongside the financing
function) in the CINS cases discussed above.64 A central feature of the
CINS partnership transactions was the initial allocation of gain to the
foreign bank partner (the tax-indifferent party) followed by the allocation
of losses—after the exit of the foreign bank from the partnership—to the
domestic partner seeking to use those losses to offset capital gains.65 Thus,
the combined actions of the third-party foreign bank—providing the
requisite financing and making a timely exit—allowed the losses to be
diverted to the party seeking to utilize them. In this way, third parties help
to accomplish the desired location of tax items, such as losses.
The stripping function of third parties in shelter cases is also
observable in ―lease stripping‖ shelter transactions. For example, in
Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, an equipment sale-leaseback stripping
transaction, the taxpayer partnership (whose interests were originally held
by foreign individuals) purchased equipment from a seller and leased it
back to the seller, receiving a stream of rental income.66 The partnership
then sold the rental income stream to a third-party bank, effectively
―stripping‖ the rental income from the equipment and accelerating its
61. E.g., id. at 239-40.
62. E.g., id. at 247-48. Accord supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
63. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61, 102(a) (2006).
64. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d at 239, 242-43.
66. 331 F.3d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2003), aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, 1480,
1491-94 (2002).
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recognition to the year in which Andantech‘s partners were foreign and
therefore tax indifferent.67 Subsequently, 98% of the partnership interests
were sold to a domestic taxpayer, thereby enabling the new domestic
partner to utilize the tax attributes (depreciation deductions).68 The new
domestic partner would be able to take advantage of these tax attributes
without having to recognize income because the income recognition had
been accelerated upon the sale of the rent stream to the banks,69 causing it
to have hit the tax return of the tax-indifferent foreign partners.70 Hence, in
Andantech and other lease stripping cases, the third-party bank‘s
participation triggered acceleration of the income stream, allowing the tax
benefits to be enjoyed by the domestic partner while the income was
diverted to a tax-indifferent party. The Andantech case illustrates the
stripping/diversion function of third parties and shows how the stripping
function works in conjunction with the realization and financing functions
of such third parties to trigger desired tax consequences. This diversion
role of third parties can be seen in lease stripping cases and various other
types of cases.71
B.

Third-Party Relationships in Context: Understanding Their
Proliferation

The foregoing discussion illustrates the critically important role that
third-party participants play in triggering desired tax consequences. The
roles of third parties today are more important than ever. As others have
noted, the nature of contemporary tax shelter transactions has undeniably
changed as compared to pre-1986 shelters,72 and the roles played by third
67. Id. at 973, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1494-95.
68. Id. at 973-74, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1495-96.
69. Note that the banks were performing a realization/timing function as well as a
financing function.
70. Andantech, 331 F.3d at 974, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1498.
71. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.
2001) (taxpayer was able to divert revenue from excess value charges collected from
customers to its offshore subsidiary by making insurance payments to a third-party
insurance company; insurance company collected commission, excise taxes, and fees, and
sent remainder of insurance payments to taxpayer‘s Bermuda subsidiary under reinsurance
contract); CMA Consol., Inc., T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16 (another equipment lease stripping
case).
72. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775,
1776 (1999) (discussing characteristics of the post-1986 tax shelter market and arguing that
―[t]he new corporate tax shelter is much more sophisticated and complex than its 1980s
predecessor,‖ and that ―[i]t is also much more aggressive in its interpretation of the tax
law‖); Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 12, at 1951-52 (noting that pre-1986 shelters were
of the same general type with ―virtually all involv[ing] the creation of artificial
(noneconomic) losses for passive investors through the combination of tax preferences . . .
and interest expense deductions‖ and comparing this to contemporary tax shelters, which are
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parties in these transactions have evolved as well. A key shift in
contemporary tax shelter transactions is the increasing involvement of
participants such as tax-exempt entities and foreign entities, and the
increasingly diverse nature of such participation.73
More of this
participation is occurring by way of flow-through entities, and such thirdparty participation increasingly serves to arbitrage between different sets of
tax rules, including tax rules governing non-U.S. taxpayers and the tax
rules of other countries.74 Furthermore, as others have argued, those who
stand to make large profits are more aggressive in structuring, marketing,
and promoting shelter transactions.75 These developments have arguably
been fueled by advancements in telecommunications and technology,
which have also made it easier for persons to interact, negotiate, and form
relationships with other parties and to enter into relationships and
―considerably more varied in design—and in the Code provisions they exploit‖);
McCormack, supra note 12, at 703, 706-08 (contrasting relative homogeneity of early
shelter transactions with the complexity, diversity, numerosity, aggressiveness, and ―rapid
proliferation‖ of current shelters); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax
Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 83-95 (2006) (describing how the
tax shelter market ―took off‖ in the decade after 1986).
73. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 5, at 145 (noting ―the frequent insertion of ‗tax
indifferent parties‘ into the transaction, whose role it is to absorb the unfavorable tax aspects
of‖ transactions using derivative instruments and stating that ―this unlikely ménage of
players is brought together by the promoter for the sole purpose of generating the soughtafter tax benefits for the corporate ‗investor‘‖). See also Bankman, supra note 72, at 1777
(listing as one of the characteristics of the ―new‖ corporate tax shelter that ―the shelter
involves a domestic corporation and a person in the zero tax bracket,‖ and noting that
―[m]ost commonly, the zero-bracket taxpayer is a foreign person not subject to U.S. tax, but
Native American Tribes, domestic corporations with unusable net operating losses, and
exempt organizations have also been used‖); Eustice, supra note 5, at 147 (stating that there
seems to be ―no magic bullet, or stake-in-the-heart solution‖ to the tax shelter problem
because ―[t]he current deals are too diverse‖);.
74. See sources cited supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. See also GAO
REPORT ON NETWORK TAX EVASION, supra note 10 (studying the problem of network-based
tax evasion).
75. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 5, at 146 (describing the ―stunning profitability of
these corporate shelter transactions for their promoters‖); McCormack, supra note 12, at 708
(―[T]he players in the new tax shelter battles are both enumerative and aggressive. Those
who market current tax shelters . . . do so in a bullish manner because of the lucrative nature
of the business.‖). See also STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., REP. ON U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS (Comm. Print 2003)
(―[T]he development and sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters have become a
lucrative business in the United States, and professional organizations like major accounting
firms, banks, investment advisory firms, and law firms have become major developers and
promoters. The evidence also shows that respected professional firms are spending
substantial resources, forming alliances, and developing the internal and external
infrastructure necessary to design, market, and implement hundreds of complex tax shelters,
some of which are illegal and improperly deny the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars in tax
revenues.‖).
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transactions that enable the avoidance of taxation.76 The increased
presence of actors looking to facilitate the creation of formal relationships
means greater markets and opportunities for relationship formation
between taxpayers and third parties.
There are two legal developments that have played a particularly
important role in facilitating the growing use and importance of third-party
participation in aggressive tax planning.
1.

Evolution in the Laws of Entity Classification

Most significantly, developments over time in the law of entity
formation and classification have contributed to the ease with which
taxpayers are able to form relationships (and choose the form of such
relationships) with others. Under current law, eligible ―business entities‖
are allowed to choose whether to be classified for tax purposes as a
partnership or as an association taxable as a corporation.77 This ability to
elect one‘s entity classification for tax purposes resulted from the IRS‘s
1996 adoption of the so-called check-the-box regulations.78 These
regulations generally provide that eligible taxpayers may elect their federal
tax classification by filing IRS Form 8832 and checking the appropriate
box.79
The choice of whether to be classified as a corporation or as a
partnership is a significant one for tax purposes because corporations and
partnerships are treated differently under the Code. Generally speaking,
corporations are subject to double taxation at both the entity and the
shareholder level, while partnerships are not subject to an entity-level tax
76. See generally Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business
Profits in the Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719 (2003) (noting the increased ability
for tax avoidance due to technological advances and the advent of e-commerce, and
proposing reform based on a ―market country‖ concept).
77. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -2(b); IRS Form 8832. Business entities classified
per se as corporations are not eligible to make the election. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), 2(b). The term ―business entities‖ also does not include entities classified as trusts under
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 or subject to a special tax regime under the Code. Id. § 301.77012(a). Eligible ―business entities‖ that do not make an explicit election are classified by
default as either corporations or partnerships, depending on whether that entity is a domestic
or a foreign entity, and depending on whether all of its owners have limited liability. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(b). For ―business entities‖ with a single owner the choice is between
disregarded entity and corporate classification, rather than partnership or corporate
classification. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -3(b)(1)(ii), -3(b)(2)(i)(C). For purposes of
analyzing taxpayer relationships with third parties, this discussion focuses on entities with
more than one owner (i.e., the partnership vs. corporation distinction).
78. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as adopted by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215). These
regulations, which were proposed in May and finalized in December 1996, became effective
January 1, 1997.
79. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b), -3(a).
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and are taxed instead on a flow-through basis.80 With respect to shelter
transactions, the use of partnerships enables a host of opportunities for tax
avoidance. First, partnership classification has the potential to allow
parties to allocate income items to a tax-indifferent party and loss items to a
partner most able to use these losses, thus opening up avoidance
possibilities.81 In addition, partnership classification may allow a partner to
use the losses generated from the activities of the partnership to offset
income from other sources.82 The use of partnership losses to offset other
income can be seen in a number of tax shelter cases.83 Furthermore, the
fact that the check-the-box elective entity classification system was also
made applicable to foreign entities has opened up new opportunities for tax
planning in the cross-border context.84
The use of partnerships in tax planning certainly did not begin with
adoption of the check-the-box regulations.85 These regulations were merely
80. Compare I.R.C. §§ 11(a), 61(a)(7) (2006), and I.R.C. § 301 (2006) (effectuating
corporate double taxation), with I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (taxation of partnerships).
81. Under the provisions of Subchapter K, the income, loss, deductions, credits, and
other tax items of a partnership are generally taken into account at the partner level, and
may be allocated in accordance with the partnership agreement, provided the allocation has
―substantial economic effect.‖ I.R.C. § 704 (2006). See also Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v.
Comm‘r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (illustrating use of partnership structure to generate
losses for the appropriate partner).
82. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 7 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter, JCT
REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION] (noting that one reason for preferring pass-through tax
treatment is that ―owners may wish to use losses generated by the business to offset income
from other sources‖). See also Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, A Tasket: Basketing and
Corporate Tax Shelters, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557 (2011) (proposing to segregate corporate
taxpayers‘ passive and active income in order to prevent use of offsetting losses).
83. See, e.g., Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010); ACM P‟ship,
157 F.3d 231; Santa Monica Pictures, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157.
84. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -3(b)(2). Various commentators have argued that
electivity of corporate, partnership, or disregarded entity status make it easier for taxpayers
to avoid income inclusion under the Subpart F ―controlled foreign corporation‖ rules, allow
taxpayers to get tax savings by getting rid of deferral, and permit taxpayers greater leeway
to utilize foreign tax credits. See, e.g., JCT REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note
82, at 19 n.32 (citing Reuven Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral As We Know It: Simplification
Potential of Check-The-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219, 219-20 (1997)); Harvey Mogenson &
David Benson, IRS Issues Final Check-the-Box Regs—Tax Simplification Creates Planning
Opportunities, 13 TAX NOTES INT‘L 2159 (1996)). See also Heather Field, Checking In On
“Check-The-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 487-91 (2009) (discussing problems and
concerns pertaining to application of the check-the-box system in the international context).
85. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS § 85.3.1 (4th ed. 2003) (noting increase in partnership tax shelters in
the 1970s); ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S. PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION ¶ 19.01[3] (6th ed. 1997) (discussing ―substantial growth in large syndicated tax
shelters as limited partnerships‖ in the 1970s); Eustice, supra note 5, at 138 (noting that ―the
entity status issue . . . has been through many phases before reaching its current state of
nearly unlimited entity selectivity‖).
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the culmination of shifts over time that gradually made it easier for
taxpayers to enter into formal relationships with other persons, regardless
of the substance of those relationships.86 Prior to the check-the-box
regulations, taxpayers could ensure that an entity would be classified as a
corporation rather than a partnership by satisfying the ―corporate
resemblance‖ test set forth in the so-called Kintner regulations, the
Treasury Regulations in effect at that time.87 However, by eliminating the
need to meet the factors set forth in the Kintner regulations, these
regulations have had the effect of allowing favorable entity classification
status to be obtained more cheaply, simply, and with more certainty. This
has made entity-based tax planning less risky and more palatable for riskaverse players and less sophisticated players.88
Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Taxation has noted that the ―check-the-box‖ regime has had
the effects of eliminating or reducing transaction costs, lowering
compliance costs, enhancing entity-choice availability for taxpayers other
than the well-advised or sophisticated, indirectly affecting the substance of
tax rules that are dependent on an entity‘s classification, and generally
making tax planning easier.89 Thus, the implementation of ―check-the-box‖
86. Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed
Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds.,
2005) (describing the history behind the rise of limited liability company statutes and the
eventual adoption of the check-the-box regulations).
87. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as adopted by T.D. 6503, 1960-2
C.B. 409 and amended by T.D. 8697). In Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976, 979
(D. Mont. 1952), aff‟d 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), the federal district court and the Ninth
Circuit determined that an association of medical professionals that had more corporate than
non-corporate characteristics was taxable as a corporation for federal tax purposes. The IRS
subsequently adopted the ―corporate resemblance‖ approach of Kintner in regulations issued
in 1960. The Kintner regulations set forth six ―major characteristics ordinarily found in a
pure corporation‖: (i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for
corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests, and
stated that an entity with more corporate than non-corporate characteristics would be treated
as a corporation. Id. In performing this analysis, the Kinter regulations disregarded
characteristics common to both corporate and non-corporate entities. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(a) (citing Morrissey v. Comm‘r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)).
88. Field, supra note 84, at 471-74 (discussing the benefits of increased certainty and
simplicity).
89. JCT REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 82, at 2 (stating that regulations
―simplify and liberalize the entity classification rules, thereby enhancing the ability of the
owners of a business entity to choose to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes.‖); id. at
17-18 (―The principal impact is that taxpayers may now choose with greater simplicity and
lower compliance costs whether they will pay two levels of tax on business income under
the corporate tax rules, or whether they will pay only one level of tax under the partnership
tax rules . . . . The check-the-box regulations facilitate transactions that could not usually be
done (or could be done only in a convoluted or expensive manner) under prior law, but now
may be accomplished more simply, efficiently or cheaply.‖); id. at 21 (discussing ―the
indirect effect of broad electivity . . . on other tax rules whose application is dependent on
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has allowed taxpayers to more easily enter into formal relationships with
other parties that generate desired tax consequences, and to do so with
more certainty. The evolution of tax law‘s approach to entity classification
is arguably more broadly reflective of the growth in the number of planning
options for the formation of business entities generally.90
2.

The Multiple-Party Presumption of Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States

Developments in the laws of entity formation and classification aside,
another factor has also contributed to the growing significance of taxpayer
relationships with third parties over time.
The Supreme Court‘s
suggestion, in its seminal 1978 Frank Lyon decision,91 that that case was
distinguishable from the transaction in Helvering v. Lazarus & Co.92 based
on the existence of multiple parties,93 has caused the existence of third
parties in tax-planning transactions to be viewed more enthusiastically by
practitioners than might otherwise have been the case.94 Frank Lyon
concerned a multi-party sale-leaseback transaction and was a case in which
the tax transaction admittedly ―took shape according to [the third-party

the taxpayer‘s tax status‖). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 183-85 (Comm. Print 2005)
[hereinafter JCT, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE] (describing the regulations as
having ―created some unintended tax-avoidance opportunities as applied to foreign entities‖
and noting that ―the expressly elective approach of the current regulations has removed
some frictions that may have acted as a brake on some of the tax planning involving the
classification of entities‖); Field, supra note 84, at 471-96 (discussing how well the checkthe-box system has met the goals of simplicity and administrability, efficiency and reduction
of transaction costs, and flexibility/neutrality).
90. See generally Hamill, Story of LLCs, supra note 86; Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman,
Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 305
(2005).
91. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
92. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
93. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 575-76 (―The present case, in contrast [to Lazarus],
involves three parties . . . the presence of the third party, in our view, significantly
distinguishes this case from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority.‖)
94. See Hoffman F. Fuller, Sales and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 60, 81 (1979) (cautioning that sale-leaseback transactions ―should not be
limited to two parties; a third-party lender should be involved‖); Bernard Wolfman, The
Supreme Court in the Lyon‟s Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075,
1087-88 (1981) (asserting that in distinguishing multiparty transactions from two party
transactions, ―the Court‘s opinion does nothing but signal tax lawyers that clients seeking
tax shelter should never travel in pairs‖). The presence of purposefully secured third-party
participation has encountered varying degrees of respect from courts. See also Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., 90 Fed. Cl. at 267, 270-72, 338 (making numerous references to the
Frank Lyon ―multiple-party transaction‖ standard). Compare Bussing v. Comm‘r, 88 T.C.
449 (1987) with Newman v. Comm‘r, 902 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
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bank‘s] needs.‖95 In Frank Lyon, the third-party bank had originally sought
to construct a new building for its headquarters and banking facility. 96
However, state and federal banking laws and regulations prevented the
bank from financing, constructing, and owning the proposed building
itself.97 This led the bank to enter into the sale-leaseback transaction at
issue with the taxpayer and a finance agency, whereby the taxpayer (Lyon)
would own the building and deduct depreciation, rent, and other expenses
on its tax return, while including in income rent received from the bank.98
Under this set of circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the
transaction should be respected for tax purposes and distinguished the case
from Lazarus on the ground that that case only involved two parties.99 As
others have noted, Frank Lyon has wrongly established a presumption of
respect toward transactions employing multiple unrelated party
relationships, as distinct from transactions not involving multiple parties,
and has encouraged the formal use of unnecessary parties in tax
transactions.100 This has somewhat undercut the effectiveness of the
traditional anti-abuse doctrines.
In sum, the evolution of tax law‘s approach to entity classification into
its present form, and the lingering effects of the Frank Lyon presumption,
suggest that increasingly aggressive and complex third-party participation
is here to stay. As argued further in Part III, these two factors have also
served to inhibit the effectiveness of traditional judicial doctrines like
substance-over-form or economic substance in adequately dealing with
aggressive and increasingly sophisticated relationship formation between
taxpayers and third parties. They have accomplished this by introducing
new and more complex ways for persons to form written and unwritten
relationships with each other and by making relevant considerations that
95. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561, 563, 576.
96. Id. at 563.
97. Id. at 563-64. As described in the Court‘s opinion, the bank‘s original plan had to
be abandoned because (1) under Arkansas law, the bank was only allowed to pay a limited
amount of interest on the debentures it wanted to issue in order to finance construction and
this interest limitation would cause the debentures not to be marketable; and (2) state and
federal regulatory approval would be required in order for the bank to invest in premises of
a certain value relative to the bank‘s capitalization, and the bank had been informed that
such approval would not be forthcoming. Id.
98. Id. at 561.
99. Id. at 564, 583-84 (―[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction
with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by taxavoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the
allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.‖).
100. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 94; Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1099-1100 (―A
Supreme Court opinion ought not become the basis for tax lawyers to make a laughingstock
of the Court as they now do when quite routinely they add unnecessary third parties to
financing transactions in order to qualify for the shelter of Frank Lyon.‖).
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offset the analytical force of the lens that has traditionally been applied to
interrogate transactions for ―risk‖ or ―substance.‖
III. JUDICIAL ANTI-ABUSE ANALYSIS AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Judicial anti-abuse analysis is relationship analysis. However,
traditional judicial anti-abuse analysis cannot be the sum total of how we
confront relationality in tax planning. Part III.A shows that relationship
analysis is an integral (albeit often unspoken) part of judicial anti-abuse
analysis. Parts III.B and III.C examine the challenges facing courts in
dealing with third-party relationality in applying anti-abuse doctrines and
discuss how judicial treatments of third-party relationships can be
improved.
A.

Judicial Doctrines as Relationship Analysis

Anti-abuse doctrines play a critical role in judicial evaluations of tax
shelter cases.101 In addition to judicial anti-abuse rules, there are also
statutory and regulatory anti-abuse rules that may apply to shelter
transactions.102 However, for a variety of reasons, judicial anti-abuse rules
have enjoyed more widespread application and have been more successful
in curbing abusive shelter transactions.103 Therefore, the focus of this
Article is on the judicial anti-abuse doctrines (including the recently
codified economic substance doctrine).
The judicial anti-abuse doctrines—which include the substance-overform doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, the step-transaction doctrine,
the business purpose doctrine, and the economic substance doctrine—are
related and overlapping judicial doctrines that are applied by courts to deny
favorable tax consequences in tax-driven transactions.104 These doctrines
are often applied in situations where the transaction satisfies the literal
101. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 85, at ¶ 4.3 (discussing pervasive
judicial doctrines); YORAM KEINAN, 508 TAX MGMT., THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
(BNA 2007); JEFFREY H. PARAVANO & MELINDA L. REYNOLDS, 798 TAX MGMT., TAX
SHELTERS § I.B (BNA 2003).
102. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269; 482 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (partnership anti-abuse
regulation).
103. PARAVANO & REYNOLDS, supra note 101, § I.B (―[S]tatutory and regulatory [antiabuse] rules have generally been less effective than the judicial doctrines.‖). Some of these
reasons include vagueness, overbreadth, and unrealistic burdens of proof. Id. §§ I.B.2 &
I.B.3.
104. See generally, KEINAN, supra note 101, §§ III-IV. While these doctrines have
traditionally been common law doctrines, the economic substance doctrine was recently
codified by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029 (March 30, 2010), as the new 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West
2010). See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
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letter of the statute but leads to unintended or ―too good to be true‖ tax
results. The application of these doctrines by courts is sometimes
confusing. Courts may apply more than one doctrine to deny tax benefits
in any one case.105 And applications of the doctrines have not been
consistent across courts and circuits.106
Probably the most discussed, debated, and applied of the judicial antiabuse doctrines is the newly codified economic substance doctrine.107 By
way of background, the economic substance doctrine is a widely applied
doctrine that, like the other judicial anti-abuse doctrines, originated in
common law. In its common law incarnation, it had two main components
or ―prongs‖—one objective and the other subjective.108 The subjective,
―business purpose‖ component generally held that a transaction engaged in
solely for tax avoidance, and for no independent non-tax business purpose,
would not be recognized as valid.109 The other prong of the contemporary
economic substance doctrine, the so-called objective prong, had several
different formulations, all of which asked in one way or another whether
the transaction resulted in a meaningful change in the taxpayer‘s economic
position.110 The economic substance doctrine in its uncodified form was
not uniformly applied across circuits—while some courts considered the
test to be a disjunctive one, others viewed the two prongs as conjunctive.111
Still other courts applied a unitary sham test in determining whether
economic substance exists.112
After extensive debate and various legislative proposals, Congress
finally codified the economic substance doctrine in the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 as a conjunctive, two-part test
105. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-1 n.9 (citing JCT, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE, supra note 89, at 14); see also e.g., Andantech, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476
(applying the step transaction doctrine, sham transaction doctrine, and substance over form
doctrine).
106. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-1.
107. See infra notes 108-114.
108. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-41.
109. The business purpose prong developed out of another long-standing judicial
doctrine, the business purpose doctrine. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935); Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972); Comm‘r v. Transp.
Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949). After Frank Lyon was
decided in 1978, the business purpose doctrine was incorporated into the present-day, twopronged economic substance doctrine to form the subjective prong of the two-pronged,
economic substance test. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); see also Rice‘s Toyota World
v. Comm‘r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a transaction will be treated as ―a
sham‖ if ―the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax
benefits . . . and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable
possibility of a profit exists‖).
110. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-43.
111. Id. at A-42.
112. Id.
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requiring the transaction to ―change[] in a meaningful way (apart from
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position‖ and that ―the
taxpayer ha[ve] a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax
effects) for entering into such transaction.‖113 The effects of this doctrine‘s
codification will be further discussed in Parts IV and V of this Article.114
Aside from the economic substance doctrine, courts also apply other
related judicial doctrines, such as the substance-over-form doctrine and the
sham transaction doctrine. As its name suggests, the substance-over-form
doctrine holds that in situations where the substance of a transaction is
different from its form, substance controls.115 In such situations, courts
may re-characterize the transaction in accordance with its actual substance,
leading to tax consequences different than those desired by the taxpayer.116
The sham transaction doctrine is a doctrine similar to the economic
substance doctrine in that it basically asks whether the way a transaction
has been structured comports with underlying economic realities.117
While these anti-abuse doctrines can be confusing, overlapping, and
inconsistently applied, they all are, at their core, concerned with evaluating
the merits of the chosen form of suspect transactions.118 And, as discussed
113. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2010) (applicable to transactions entered into after
March 30, 2010). The newly enacted provision contains special rules for situations in which
the taxpayer relies on profit potential, and for treatment of fees, foreign taxes, and state and
local taxes. Id. § 7701(o)(2).
114. In particular, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
115. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. 465; In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d
Cir. 2002).
116. See, e.g., Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (applying
substance over form in leasing case). For a more in-depth discussion of such
recharacterization in the context of leasing, see Shu-Yi Oei, Context Matters: The
Recharacterization of Leases in Bankruptcy and Tax Law, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 635 (2008).
117. This is, at least, what the ―sham in substance‖ doctrine does. Like the economic
substance doctrine, the ―sham in substance doctrine‖ has different variations across courts.
Compare Falsetti v. Comm‘r, 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985) (defining ―sham in substance‖ as ―the
expedient of drawing up papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic
realities and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax benefits‖), with
Friedman v. Comm‘r, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989) (―A ‗sham‘ transaction is one that
has no economic effect other than the creation of tax losses.‖), and Rice‟s Toyota World,
752 F.2d at 91 (―To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was
motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the
transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable
possibility of a profit exists.‖). In contrast, the ―sham-in-fact‖ standard looks at transactions
that may have been ―papered‖ but that never actually occurred. See Kirchman v. Comm‘r,
862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (―Shams in fact are transactions that never occur . . . .
Shams in substance are transactions that actually occurred but which lack the substance their
form represents.‖).
118. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to
Interpret the Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 206 (2001) (―One of the
common threads in the corporate tax shelter cases is that the transactions that have been
scrutinized under the business purpose, economic substance, and sham transaction doctrines,
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in Part II, what are the transactions but a series of tax events planned and
taking place using relationships and interactions between taxpayers and
third parties?119 Since most shelter transactions cannot occur absent thirdparty cooperation and participation, the evaluation of such transactions
under commonly applied judicial doctrines is an inherently relationshipevaluative exercise. Correspondingly, one might say that it is precisely
because aggressive (and technically Code-compliant) relationship
formation is a feature of abusive tax planning transactions that anti-abuse
doctrines probing the realities of these relationships exist in the first place.
Put even more strongly, insofar as transactional tax planning largely
consists of arranging a transaction (or series of transactions) that yields a
good tax result, and insofar as transactions normally need third parties in
order to happen, it is very, very hard to do transactional tax planning
without the involvement of third parties. This means that it is virtually
impossible to separate our judgments about the merits of a transaction from
our judgments about the relationships that make the transaction possible.
When one says that a tax transaction is a ―shelter‖ or is ―abusive‖ or is
―lacking substance‖ or is a ―sham,‖ underlying such statements is a
commentary about the ―false‖ or ―contentless‖ or ―sham‖ nature of the
relationships and relational events occurring in the transaction, whether
judges realize this or not and whether their commentary on the underlying
relationships is explicit or not.
The relationship-evaluative component of judicial anti-abuse doctrines
may appear obvious but must not be taken for granted. The need to make
explicit the relationship interpretation element of judicial shelter analysis is
particularly acute at the present time because, for the reasons discussed in
Part II, aggressively formed and substance-lacking relationships with third
parties have become much more widespread than at the time the judicial
anti-abuse doctrines were developed by the courts.120 That is, the judicial
doctrines as applied in today‘s shelter environment are faced with much
more aggressive relationality than the judicial doctrines as conceived.121 As
discussed, reasons for this may include increased promoter activity, better
technology, and more easily manipulable entity formation and
classification rules. The willingness or ability of judges to use judicial antiabuse doctrines to adequately interrogate increasingly aggressive
relationality is therefore not a foregone conclusion. Thus, raising
and which have been found to be lacking, are transactions outside the ordinary course of the
taxpayer‘s business.‖).
119. See discussion supra Part II.
120. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561; Gregory, 293 U.S. 465; Rice‟s Toyota World, 752
F.2d 89; Weinert‘s Estate v. Comm‘r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961); BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 85, § 4.3 (citing United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921));
KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-5 to A-9. See also sources cited supra notes 72-73.
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
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awareness and posing questions about what courts in shelter cases are and
should be doing in applying long-standing judicial doctrines is both timely
and necessary.122
B.

Limitations of the Current Approach

So, is there anything really wrong with simply continuing to apply
present judicial anti-abuse doctrines in analyzing relationships in shelter
cases, particular since many courts do already appreciate that the nature of
a third-party relationship determines whether a given transaction (or series
of transactions) contains the requisite risk or substance to be respected?123
Despite the apparent adequacy of the current approach, this Article
contends that it is in fact inadequate, for two important reasons.
1.

The Ultimate Artificiality of the Economic Substance Analysis

Far from being a complete solution to the problem of complex and
hidden relationality, the economic substance and sham transaction
doctrines are ultimately artificial constructs that do not go far enough. This
is not news. Recent scholarship has acknowledged their limitations in new
ways, pointing out, for example, that the ―framing‖ of a tax transaction has
important impacts on case outcomes.124
That is, construing ―the
transaction‖ narrowly as being the discrete part of the deal that creates the
tax minimization opportunity can lead to a finding of lack of economic
substance, while framing it more broadly as including the larger business
deal may lead to the opposite result.125 Once the effects of a transaction‘s
―frame‖ in changing outcomes of shelter litigation are recognized, it
becomes clear that the anti-abuse doctrines are not all-powerful.
The ―framing‖ construct can also be applied longitudinally:
embracing the concept of a ―deal‖ or transaction to ―minimize taxes‖ and
trying to determine whether that discretely framed deal holds the potential

122. This is no less true now that the economic substance doctrine has been codified and
the ―objective prong‖ standard adopted in the new statute asks whether ―the transaction
changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer‘s
economic position.‖ 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (West 2010). Though the new provision
does not mention relationships, relationship evaluation is implicit, because whether there is
the requisite ―meaningful change‖ depends, of course, on the dynamics of the relationships
underlying the tax transactions.
123. See infra notes 128–137 and accompanying text. Other scholars seem to agree. See
Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1258, 1261-62.
124. David Hariton, The Frame Game: How Defining the “Transaction” Decides the
Case, 63 TAX LAW. 1 (2009).
125. Id. at 4, 7-14 (providing examples of courts characterizing transactions utilizing
either broad or narrow perspectives and holding accordingly).
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for ―pre-tax profit‖ or ―economic effects‖ necessarily involves delineating
an artificial ―end point‖ to the tax deal. In the context of long-term and
continuing relationships between the players, however, it is doubtful that
such an end point actually exists. The relationship between the players
may well proceed to take on further dimensions and may involve other
(future) contracts and understandings beyond the discretely and artificially
framed ―tax deal‖ in a manner that undercuts the apparent economic effects
or profit potential in the instant ―deal.‖ The effects of such future contracts
and understandings might not be adequately taken into account under
current doctrine.
What can be done about the problem of continuing relationships and
their effects beyond the boundaries of an instant tax litigation
(conceptualized as a discrete transaction or series of transactions with a
clear end point)?
From a commercial standpoint, the answer,
unfortunately, is very little, given the realities of a market economy. What
can and should be done from a taxing standpoint is to lay a framework to
increase judicial awareness of the possibility of ongoing relationships
undercutting discrete-transaction findings of substance. The solutions
offered in Part V of this Article go some way toward accomplishing this.126
Suffice it to say, at this juncture, the judicial anti-abuse doctrines are not
cure-alls for aggressive relationality.
2.

Uneven Applications of Doctrines and Overriding Effects of the
Frank Lyon Presumption

As hinted at in Part II, another key problem facing courts in their
analysis of aggressive relationality is that the presumption in favor of
respecting transactions between multiple parties that was created by Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States still resonates in case law today.127 However,
notwithstanding the Frank Lyon presumption, it is clear that third-party
relationships actually have indeterminate significance for purposes of
evaluating whether a transaction has ―substance.‖ The mere existence of a
third-party relationship can suggest any number of things, and thus, in the
end, may not tell us enough about the bona fides of a transaction, absent
further analysis.
Conceptually speaking, this almost certainly has to be true. Since
desired tax consequences in shelter (and non-shelter) arrangements are
mostly generated through transactions between parties, and since
transactions are based upon relationships with third parties and not all
126. See discussion infra Part V.A.
127. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84. See also supra Part II.B (discussing impacts of the
Frank Lyon decision on creation of multiple-party transactions); Wolfman, supra note 94, at
1099-1100 (discussing the scope and applicability of Frank Lyon).
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transactions hold up in court, it follows that not all taxpayer-created
relationships with third parties deserve validation. So, for example, a
relationship or transaction with a third party in a shelter transaction could
be construed as an arm‘s length relationship suggesting genuineness.128 On
the other hand, the third party could simply have been inserted as a ―straw‖
or a ―mule‖ to create the illusion of a Frank Lyon-type multiple-party
transaction.129 The eventual determination of whether a shelter transaction
has substance depends largely on which of these polar opposite
interpretations a court adopts.130
Also, a transaction with a third party might well display the types of
―practical economic effects‖ necessary for a transaction to be respected.131
128. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84 (―Where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or
regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely
by tax avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should
honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.‖); id. at 580 (―Lyon [(the
taxpayer)] is not a corporation with no purpose other than to hold title to the bank building.
It was not created by [the bank] or even financed to any degree by [the bank].‖). See also
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d at 1018 (noting the existence of a ―real insurance
policy‖ between UPS and an unrelated third-party insurer); IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 355
(―[T]hese were not transactions conducted by alter-egos of IES or straw entities created by
IES simply for the purpose of conducting ADR trades . . . . All of the parties involved . . .
were entities separate and apart from IES, doing legitimate business before IES started
trading ADRs and (as far as we know) continuing such legitimate business after that time . .
. . Each trade was an arm‘s-length transaction: ‗what was actually done is what the parties
to the transaction purported to do.‘‖) (internal citations omitted)); Compaq Computer Corp.,
277 F.3d at 784 (acknowledging the IES Industries approach to third parties, but adding its
own analysis of third parties and the existence of risk); Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding it ―relevant that the parties were independent of each other‖); Mukerji v.
Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 926, 968 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Bussing, 89 T.C. at 1051 (disregarding the presence of a third-party
corporation (Sutton) in a complex sale-lease back transaction, characterizing that party‘s
presence as ―not an ownership interest‖ but rather as that of a ―straw man‖ designed to make
the transaction look like a multiple-party transaction to bring the case under the Frank Lyon
rubric and denying the taxpayer‘s motion for reconsideration). See also id. at 1054
(―Sutton‘s president perceived Sutton‘s role solely to be that of a middleman required to
qualify the transaction for Federal tax purposes.‖); id. at 1055 (―As Sutton‘s president
testified, Sutton was inserted into the transaction solely to make the transaction appear as a
multiple-party transaction for Federal tax purposes . . . . Sutton‘s blink-of-an-eye interest in
the transaction must be disregarded.‖); Bussing, 88 T.C. at 457-58 (noting that ―Sutton was
inserted in the transaction . . . to facilitate the appearance of satisfying the ‗at risk‘ provision
of section 465 and to make the transaction appear to be a genuine multiple party transaction
for purposes of applying Frank Lyon,‖ and finding that the transaction was ―not a genuine
multiple-party transaction, but a . . . sale-leaseback pursuant to which the respective lease
and debt obligations flow between only two parties‖).
130. Compare IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 355-56 (finding trades at issue were at arm‘s
length and between unrelated parties; taxpayer wins), with Bussing, 89 T.C. at 1055-56
(finding third party disregarded as ―straw man‖; taxpayer loses).
131. In applying the economic substance doctrine, some courts have asked whether the
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On the other hand, such practical economic effects could be illusory, or
could be undercut by unwritten understandings or relationships that escape
the gaze of the observer.132 A transaction with a third party might create
genuine risk for the taxpayer, suggesting the presence of economic effects
or substance.133 On the other hand, third-party transactions and agreements
may have been used to eliminate risk.134 Finally, the fact that a transaction
has taken place between putatively unrelated parties might suggest that the
pricing of the deal (which, of course, impacts the amount of tax benefits
realized)135 was at arm‘s length and at fair value.136 However, as a result of
transaction has any ―economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits‖ or ―practical
economic effects.‖ E.g., Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1492; Hutchinson v. United States, 90-2
USTC 50,573 (D. Or. 1990). ―Practical economic effects‖ generally means the existence or
creation of real legal obligations as a result of the transaction. Hutchinson, 90-2 USTC at
85,965-66; see also Sochin v. Comm‘r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988); Thompson v.
Comm‘r, 631 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1980). Applying this formulation of the doctrine,
courts can and have analyzed the presence of unrelated party obligees as a feature that
suggests or creates the requisite economic effects. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254
F.3d at 1018 (―The kind of ‗economic effects‘ required to entitle a transaction to respect in
taxation include the creation of genuine obligations enforceable by an unrelated party.‖).
132. See, e.g., AWG Leasing Trust, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 985-90 (finding that the way the
economics of the deal were set up meant that there was very little chance that the third-party
participant would exercise the ―service contract‖ option, and that this effectively amounted
to an almost certain exercise by the third party of the ―fixed purchase option‖); ACM P‟ship,
73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2194 (discussing all the reasons taxpayer considered the foreign bank
counterparty to be ―well suited‖ and ―friendly‖ as a partner). See also Raskolnikov,
Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1199 (risk analysis of tax planning‘s use of
unwritten understandings); cf. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 581-82 (rejecting the government‘s
position–which looked at taxpayer‘s presence on counterparty‘s board of directors and other
factors as suggesting that the counterparty was the true owner of the property–as
―theorizing‖).
133. One of the ways courts may analyze a third party‘s participation is to look at the
risk created or taken on in the transaction. In this regard, transactions with third-party
participants may be seen as holding more risk. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp., 277
F.3d at 783-84, 787 (finding that despite the parties‘ attempts to minimize risk of loss,
sufficient risk existed; relying in part on the fact that the transaction occurred in an open
market between independent parties where prices could change, rather than ―in an
environment controlled by Compaq or its agents‖). The relationship between ―practical
economic effects‖ and ―risk of loss‖ can be seen, for example, in the Eleventh Circuit‘s
opinion in United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1018.
134. E.g., AWG Leasing Trust, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 981, 983-85; Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl.
at 48-50, 53-54 (2010).
135. See supra Part II.A.2.
136. See, e.g., Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (observing that there was ―no question‖ that the
independent parties ―dealt at arm‘s length‖); Krause, 99 T.C. 132 (denying limited
partnership investors‘ deductions for losses incurred from partnership investments where
debt obligations of the partnerships were not based on arm‘s length transactions and resulted
from excessive amounts paid for technology licenses). Correspondingly, some courts have
viewed transactions between related parties with suspicion as not having been negotiated at
arm‘s length. See, e.g., E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (finding IRS‘s reallocation under I.R.C. § 482 of substantial part of foreign
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incentives to collude (see Part IV.A), this is not always the case.137
The potentially opposite significance(s) of a third party‘s presence or
actions in shelter cases means that it is impossible to evaluate whether a
transaction has substance without looking in great detail at the nature of the
relationship between the third party and the taxpayer. And, as discussed,
the relationship between the taxpayer and third party extends beyond the
boundaries of the transaction(s) at issue to include the legal and non-legal
statuses and actions of the parties at present and over time.
The good news, in terms of the ability of judicial doctrines to handle
increased relationality, is that the case law shows that judges are capable of
applying, and are in fact applying, these analytically opposite constructs in
the context of deciding tax shelter cases.138 Moreover, these constructs and
analyses are often discussed and applied by judges in the process of
applying anti-abuse doctrines.139 This shows that courts do recognize that
they are performing analysis of third-party relationships when determining
whether certain arrangements have ―substance‖ and should be respected.
The bad news is that courts are not fully consistent in their evaluations
of third-party relationships, both in terms of transparency of process and
depth of analysis.140 While many courts do implicitly or explicitly consider
the analytical impacts of third-party relationships in applying the judicial
anti-abuse doctrines to determine whether a transaction has substance, not
all courts apply a consistent methodology or a consistent degree of
attention to making such evaluation.141 This may reflect the continued

subsidiary‘s income to parent was not unreasonable); contra U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United
States, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971), aff‟g in part 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding
administrative ruling allocating income between parent and subsidiary on ground that
shipping rates charged by subsidiary to parent was not arm‘s length was unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious).
137. See Lederman I, supra note 10, at 724-33 (distinguishing ―zero sum‖ situations
from situations involving ―manufactured surplus‖).
138. See supra notes 128–137.
139. See supra notes 128–137.
140. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum, 452 F.2d at 448 (―Whether the district court addressed itself
to precisely the proper issue [i.e., the question of whether pricing was at arm‘s length] is not
free from doubt.‖).
141. Compare United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d 1014 and Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561
(cases in which presence of third party seemed to be enough), with ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 2214 (rejecting taxpayer‘s argument that ―all partnership transactions were
negotiated at arm‘s length, priced at fair market value, conducted in accordance with
standard commercial practices, and had practical effects wholly apart from their tax
consequences‖), Boca Investerings P‟ship, 314 F.3d at 632 (rejecting taxpayer‘s contention
that it was sufficient that ―the parties ‗intended to, and did, organize Boca as a partnership to
share the income, expenses, gains and losses from Boca‘s investments‘‖), and Wells Fargo,
91 Fed. Cl. at 49 (noting that pricing was not at ―fair market value‖ despite appraisal, but
that the taxpayer, appraisers and arrangers had colluded to increase the property‘s valuation
in order to maximize tax benefits).
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resonance of the Frank Lyon presumption in favor of respecting
transactions between multiple unrelated parties.142
For example, in United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit relied
on the Frank Lyon presumption and ignored the reality of the underlying
relationships between the parties in reversing the tax court and holding for
the taxpayer.143 As part of its package-shipping business, United Parcel
Service (―UPS‖) collected ―excess value charges‖ (―EVCs‖) from
customers in exchange for insuring package values in excess of $100.144
UPS decided to lessen its tax liability by restructuring its excess value
insurance program to have an overseas affiliate, Overseas Partners, Ltd.
(―OPL‖), provide the insurance, instead of UPS providing the insurance
itself.145 To execute its plan, UPS purchased an insurance contract from a
third-party insurer, National Union, paying as the premium the EVCs
collected from UPS customers.146 National Union assumed the risk of
damage to shipments in excess of $100.147 National Union then entered
into a reinsurance contract with OPL, the UPS overseas affiliate almost all
of whose shares were held by UPS shareholders.148 Under the reinsurance
contract, National Union paid to OPL the EVC premiums it had been paid
by UPS, minus commissions, fees, and excise taxes.149 In this way, UPS
was able to avoid reporting revenue from the EVCs on its tax return.150
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the tax court holding and held for
UPS.151 After noting that the ―economic effects‖ required for a transaction
to be respected ―include the creation of genuine obligations enforceable by
an unrelated party,‖ the court noted that the ―real insurance policy‖
between UPS and National Union was ―a genuine obligation‖ and that the
―reinsurance treaty‖ between National Union and OPL, ―while certainly
reducing the odds of loss,‖ did not ―completely foreclose the risk of loss
because reinsurance treaties . . . are susceptible to default.‖152 Finally, the
court noted that even if National Union were to be disregarded as a
―conduit,‖ it was still true that OPL was ―an independently taxable entity
that [was] not under UPS‘s control‖ and that ―UPS really did lose the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra Part II.B.2.
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1018.
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stream of income it had earlier reaped from excess-value charges.‖153
The United Parcel Service decision is a classic example of a court
respecting a multiple-party transaction without adequate further analysis.
The fact that the court explicitly relied on Frank Lyon in its analysis
supports this Article‘s observation that the Frank Lyon presumption acts as
a countervailing force that undermines the effectiveness of judicial antiabuse doctrines in the battle to probe the true substance of a transactional
relationship.154 The United Parcel Service court also did not fully assess
the realities of the underlying relationship between the parties to the
transaction, most notably by treating OPL as an ―independent‖ entity when
in reality it was controlled by UPS shareholders who were also employees
and thus were extremely unlikely to default on the reinsurance contract.155
The court‘s inability (or unwillingness) to see past a relationship that was,
on the surface, an arm‘s length one, and to examine the true substance of
what the connections between the taxpayers and the holders really meant,
demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional doctrines in probing the full
extent and impact of such relationships. What is needed is a more robust
approach to interrogating relationality, beyond the mere analysis of pre-tax
profit, ―genuine obligations,‖ business motivations, or risk.
It bears mentioning that the United Parcel Service dissent agreed with
the majority with respect to the need for ―economic effects other than the
creation of tax benefits‖ but disagreed with the majority‘s risk assessment,
correctly finding that the insurer‘s exposure to risk of loss was
―infinitesimal‖ and that the transaction therefore lacked economic
substance or business purpose.156 Thus, the dissent appeared to make a
more thorough and accurate analysis of the actual economics of the
relationship between the parties than the majority opinion. If the United
Parcel Service court had placed less reliance on the Frank Lyon case and
had performed a more relationally attuned analysis, perhaps it would have
reached a more economically rational conclusion.
In summary, the failure of certain courts to closely scrutinize the
relationships underlying a transaction is problematic because the
indeterminate significance of third-party relationships in shelter cases
demands an in-depth analysis of such relationships, notwithstanding Frank
Lyon‘s suggestion otherwise.157 While it is encouraging that the tools for
evaluating relationships are embedded in judicial anti-abuse doctrines and
153. Id. at 1019.
154. Id. at 1018 (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 582-83). The United Parcel Service
court could instead have conducted a more comprehensive analysis of the risk of loss and
might well have concluded that this risk was negligible had it done so. Another example of
a court applying the Frank Lyon presumption is IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 355-56.
155. United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1019.
156. Id. at 1021 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting).
157. Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1087-88.
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are frequently applied, more consistent and closer scrutiny of today‘s
sophisticated, hidden, and increasingly complex relationships is required in
applying these doctrines.
C.

The Importance of Judicial Narratives

It may also be argued that just because some courts are not explicitly
discussing third-party relationships in their opinions, this does not mean
that they are not sufficiently considering and analyzing these relationships.
From a results-oriented perspective, the fact that the IRS has emerged
victorious in several major tax shelter cases may prove that there is no
issue.158 However, there are three problems with this line of thinking.
First, it is clear from looking at cases like United Parcel Service and IES
Industries (both taxpayer victories) that the Frank Lyon presumption in
favor of respecting transactions with unrelated parties is alive and well,
notwithstanding the actual content of the underlying relationships.159
Second, it is no secret that the complexity of the subject matter and the
realities of asymmetric information and unbalanced resources between the
parties in litigation (that is, the taxpayer and the IRS) mean that it is not a
trivial matter for courts to appreciate the full extent and implications of the
third-party relationality that goes on in shelter cases. This suggests that
more can be done to enhance judicial comprehension.160 This point is
developed further in Part IV.A.161 Finally, in addition to concerns about
analytical consistency, concerns about transparency are also important
because the opaqueness of complex relationships, when paired with the
lack of explicit judicial discussion, renders such relationships less visible
than relationships and their effects in other legal spheres.162 Rather than
perpetuating dominant rule-based discourses and sublimating discourses
158. Of course, the IRS has not always emerged the victor in the past, and it is unlikely
that the Service will win all battles in the future. See Steve R. Johnson, Tax Shelters: Up
Off the Canvas?, 29 A.B.A. SEC. TAX‘N NEWS Q. NO. 2, at 1 (2010) (outlining the back-andforth history of tax shelter battles between taxpayers and the IRS, and noting that ―a
pendulum moves in one direction only for a space, after which it reverses its course‖).
159. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Frank Lyon presumption and its effects); see also
supra notes 140-156 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent case law that reflects
the Frank Lyon presumption).
160. See, e.g., Wolfman, note 94, at 1092 (noting ―inadequacy of the government‘s
advocacy‖); id. at 1100 (―In an environment of infinitely diverse and complex transactions
governed by an arcane Code, the Court cannot devote the time necessary to become
expert.‖). See also sources cited infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing
information and other asymmetries between taxpayer and IRS).
161. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (discussing adverse impacts of third-party
relationships on transparency and observability).
162. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (contrasting, as an example, scrutiny of
same-sex marriages).
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about the relational nature of tax planning, judges and judicial opinions
should help increase transparency and awareness around the use of
relationships in tax planning by bringing discussions and evaluations about
this relationality into plain sight.
*****
To sum up the discussion thus far: judicial anti-abuse analysis is, at
its core, relationship analysis. Judicially applied doctrines (such as the
economic substance doctrine) do contain the constructs necessary to
analyze and evaluate third-party relationships. And many courts are
applying these constructs to deeply probe the nature and content of
relationships between taxpayers and other persons in deciding shelter cases.
Yet problems remain with our current applications of these anti-abuse
rules.
First, judicial anti-abuse doctrines are fundamentally artificial and
limited constructs. They are particularly weak in analyzing relationships
that last over time and span beyond the discretely defined tax deal that is
before the courts.
Furthermore, judicial evaluations of complex
relationships between parties vary in robustness. In particular, some courts
appear still to be swayed by the Frank Lyon presumption of respecting
relationships if they are between unrelated parties. These factors are
compounded by the existence of information asymmetries that favor
sophisticated taxpayers at the expense of courts and the IRS and the
evolution of the legal and societal landscape that has rendered the
relationships being evaluated much more complex than they were when the
judicial doctrines were originally conceived. As a result, in determining
whether a transaction has substance, some judicial investigations of
relationships remain inadequate.
Finally, even where judges do implicitly scrutinize third-party
relationships in a thorough manner, judicial narratives about the nature and
complexity of such relationships are lacking. Explicit judicial discussions
of the relationships that facilitate tax transactions, and explanations of the
analytical steps courts are taking in parsing such relationships, are
important. Such discussions and explanations should be encouraged
because they have the power to raise public awareness about the roles of
relationality in sophisticated tax planning and encourage judicial
accountability.163

163. See discussion infra Part V.A. (advocating for explicit judicial narratives
concerning relationality).
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IV. TWO OTHER HARMS OF THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS:
EVIDENTIARY CONCEALMENT AND THE WARPING OF DOCTRINE
In addition to their vital importance in determining whether a given
transaction has sufficient substance or risk to be respected, the presence of
third parties in tax shelter transactions have two other distinct impacts on
the outcome and process of tax shelter litigation. First, far from indicating
transparent dealings, such relationships may, in fact, create incentives that
detract from what courts and others are able to observe in litigated shelter
cases, leading to decreased transparency and altered litigation outcomes.
Second, the increased role and presence of third parties has led to doctrinal
confusion in the application of the economic substance inquiry in shelter
cases, resulting in actual, unintended modifications of the doctrine in ways
that ultimately compromise their effectiveness. Specifically, it has led to
confused applications of the business purpose prong of the economic
substance inquiry. This confusion is particularly pronounced in the context
of pass-though entities.
A.

Potentially Adverse Impacts on Transparency and Observability

An important way in which relationships with third parties may
impact process and outcomes in shelter litigation is through the effects that
such relationships may have on what judges, counsel, commentators, and
other spectators are able to observe in a tax shelter case. As discussed, it is
tempting to assume that the presence of third parties in a transaction is a
more ―favorable‖ fact than if the transaction were between, say, a parent
and a controlled subsidiary, on the theory that the deal is somehow more
transparent.164 However, this is not always the case. As other scholars
have pointed out, even in the non-shelter context, not all third-party
relationships are structured in ways that incentivize openness and
transparency; in some situations, third parties have a clear incentive to
collude with a taxpayer to facilitate tax avoidance.165 In general, however,
the way in which third-party relationships affect the pragmatics of actual
tax shelter litigation has been underexplored in the academic literature.
In the context of tax shelter litigation, it is important to realize that
parties with whom a taxpayer has a personal relationship or an ongoing
164. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d 1014 (wherein court made just such
an assumption).
165. See, e.g., Lederman I, supra note 10, at 724 (―In a multitude of contexts, third
parties may actually foster evasion, colluding with the taxpayer in abusive transactions.‖);
see also Phillip A. Curry, Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failures in the Market
for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007) (discussing ways the government can cause
the tax planning market that exists between participants to fail).
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business relationship (or who hope to have such a relationship) may have
an incentive to cooperate with the taxpayer in presenting a tax transaction
in the best possible light. For example, a counterparty to a shelter
transaction that has an ongoing business relationship with the taxpayer
might be reluctant to cooperate with the IRS, in order to preserve that
ongoing relationship. Such incentives that detract from cooperation may
create problems for commentators, observers, and decision makers in
shelter cases, even in situations where cooperating third parties are
performing fairly innocuous functions.166 So, for example, a third party
with an interest in preserving an ongoing relationship may be reticent to
provide evidence that a tax-driven deal was contemplated before a certain
time, if such evidence undercuts the factual narrative the taxpayer is
attempting to present at trial. These dynamics may have consequences for
a court‘s ability to determine the true motivations underlying a transaction
or the existence of planning or premeditation with respect to a transaction.
Stated differently, motivations associated with ongoing relationship
creation and maintenance, even with respect to relationships between
supposedly arm‟s length parties, may undermine the interest in robust
discovery and disclosure of all relevant facts in trial proceedings.167
The impact of cooperative and ongoing relationships between the
taxpayer and third-party participants may, for example, show up in a third
party‘s less-than-forthcoming response to being subpoenaed in a shelter
case.168 Such third parties are required to respond to subpoenas of
documents or persons. However, incentives of a third party to collude or
cooperate with a taxpayer (or to support the factual narrative put forth by
the taxpayer in the interests of ongoing goodwill) may put added pressure
on the subpoena issuer to be extremely nuanced in determining how the
subpoena should be crafted and what documents or information to demand.
Such incentives may also create difficulties for the Service in eliciting
information from third-party witnesses called under the subpoena.169 Such
third-party resistance in effect forces the subpoena issuer or witness
166. Even third parties serving relatively innocuous functions that have an interest in
preserving longer-term business relationships (e.g., sellers and buyers of property in a
transaction) might have an incentive to be less than forthcoming with information.
167. But cf. Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1739 (―[I]nformation reporting is of most use
where the possibility of collusion is relatively small. This suggests that contexts involving
parties who generally act at arm‘s length . . . are more suitable for information reporting
than are contexts involving related parties (such as family members).‖).
168. See I.R.C. § 7456 (2006) (subpoena powers of U.S. Tax Court). See also TAX CT.
R. 147 (subpoena rules for the U.S. Tax Court); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (subpoena rules for
federal district courts); CL. CT. R. 45 (subpoena rules for the Court of Federal Claims);
GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 1.08[2] (comparing U.S. Tax Court‘s nationwide subpoena rule with
more circumscribed rule for federal districts courts and the court of federal claims).
169. See generally sources cited supra note 168.
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examiner to be extra careful in detailing the requested documents or
testimony, even assuming 100% honesty on the part of the responder.170
This is not a good thing because subpoenas of non-taxpayer parties are an
important tool used to obtain information about the surrounding context
and relationships in a tax litigation proceeding and to verify taxpayer
claims.171 Third-party reticence in information sharing can increase
litigation costs, waste resources, and exacerbate already existing
information asymmetries and disparities in resource availability between
the IRS and the taxpayer.172
The impact of a third-party relationship on the amount of information
to which judges and the IRS have access in tax litigation, and on how such
information is filtered and presented, is hard to quantify. The evidence for
this is buried in the experiential knowledge of tax litigation practitioners
and is for the most part hidden from the purview of academic scholars.
However, as any experienced tax litigator knows, the impact of such
relationships is undeniable. The motivations of parties in relation to each
other and the litigants‘ assessments of the likelihood and ease of obtaining
evidence from various players are significant factors in how a case gets
presented and litigated. Indeed, such hidden motivations play a vital role in
determining whether a case gets litigated. Difficulties in obtaining
information from third-party participants to a transaction may lead to a
greater likelihood of pre-trial settlements or a more generous settlement in
favor of taxpayers than might otherwise occur.173
In sum, the broader question raised by the presence of ongoing
relationships with third parties, beyond the notion of ―substance,‖ is how
judges can possibly be sure that the record that they are observing and the
narratives to which they are privy (and upon which the litigants no doubt
base their litigation and settlement strategies) are complete, fair, and
reflective of all of the incentives underlying the transaction. Furthermore,
how can they be certain that the record accurately describes all of the
events that actually took place between the parties to a transaction?174 The
170. See generally sources cited supra note 168.
171. See generally sources cited supra note 168.
172. Lederman II, supra note 15; David Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV.
331 (2006) (discussing ―structural imbalance‖ between government and private tax bar in
terms of information, expertise, and numbers, and proposing solutions).
173. The nature of the relationships between the parties, whether they are competitive or
cooperative and whether collaboration or collusion is present, may, for example, impact
matters of trial strategy, including which witnesses get called, whether expert witnesses are
used, and which arguments are emphasized. See generally John Herbert Tovey, Preparing a
Federal Income Tax Case for Trial, 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS 255 (1973).
174. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra, in ASA Investerings, the tax court seemed aware
that the third-party foreign bank participant sought to strengthen its relationship with the
corporation seeking to offset its gains by participating in the tax shelter transaction at issue.
76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 327 (1998) (noting that ―ABN and [taxpayer] already had a lending
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existence of these evidentiary issues may adversely impact a court‘s ability
to properly apply traditional doctrines and thus may compromise their
ability to fully evaluate the facts and the merits of the tax deal. To make
fully informed judgments about what they are seeing, judges need to
understand the hidden dynamics of the underlying relationships between
the parties to a transaction. Some relationships facilitate transparency and
honest disclosure; others demonstrate the reverse incentives.175 In cases
where the relationships impede cooperation at trial, particularly where
judges are unaware of these relationships, this has the potential to detract
from the soundness of the ultimate holding or other resolution of the case.
To this point, courts have not yet come up with a systematic approach to
guard against these problems.
B.

Impacts on the Content of Judicial Doctrine: Obfuscation of Doctrine

Taxpayer relationships with third parties have also had problematic
impacts on the content of substantive doctrine. Most notably, the
proliferation of these relationships, and the evolving forms they take, have
created confusion in the application of the business purpose analysis in tax
transactions. At one extreme, some courts have moved toward relying on
the business motivations, profit potential, economic effects, and risk of the
unrelated party participants, rather than the taxpayers themselves, in
determining whether a transaction has economic substance.176 At the other
extreme, others have held that the business purpose of non-taxpayer parties
has no relevance in determining whether a transaction should be respected
for tax purposes.177 In cases involving pass-through entities, courts have
had particular difficulty distinguishing between the taxpayer and the thirdparty participant in determining whose business motivations should
―count.‖178

relationship, but ABN believed it could strengthen that relationship by participating in the
venture and being a compliant partner‖); ASA Investerings P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 201 F.3d
505, 514 n.6. See also Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1258
(―Courts are already more suspicious of tax benefits arising from relationships that have
higher levels of trust.‖). The question is whether courts are also aware that the nature of the
underlying commercial dynamics between the parties also has effects on the procedural and
evidentiary aspects of tax shelter trials.
175. This point has been argued by other scholars. E.g., Lederman I, supra note 10.
176. See Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (crediting non-tax motivation of third-party trucking
company).
177. See Coleman v. Comm‘r, 16 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the nontaxpaying party‘s motivation not relevant).
178. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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Confusion in Whether to Allow Bootstrapping of Unrelated Party
Business Motivations

An extreme example of a case that has moved toward ―counting‖ the
third party‘s business purposes in finding that a transaction had substance is
Newman v. Commissioner.179 In Newman, the individual taxpayer claimed
an investment tax credit (―ITC‖) based on his ownership of a tractor-trailer
truck, which was used by a third-party trucking company.180 The legal
issue boiled down to whether the taxpayer had leased the truck to the
trucking company (in which case the taxpayer would not have been entitled
to the ITC) or whether the relationship was one of owner-independent
contractor.181 The court applied the economic substance inquiry in making
its determination.182 In analyzing whether there existed the requisite nontax business purpose for engaging in the transaction, the court found that
despite the tax court‘s finding that the taxpayer was not motivated by nontax considerations, this did not compel the legal conclusion that the
transaction lacked a business purpose.183 Instead, the court characterized
the Frank Lyon decision as holding that ―as long as one party is motivated
by non-tax considerations, even if it is not the taxpayer, the form of the
agreement will satisfy [the business purpose] factor.‖184 The court
proceeded to find that the third-party trucking company had non-tax
motivations for entering into the transaction, and that the business purpose
requirement was therefore satisfied.185 This tendency to take third-party
business purposes into account has been echoed elsewhere.186
The bootstrapping of third-party business purposes described in this
Part is arguably another echo of the Frank Lyon over-reliance on the
motivations and participation of unrelated parties.187 At the same time, not
all courts have allowed such bootstrapping. Some have treated the business
purposes of a third party as irrelevant in determining whether a transaction
had substance for tax purposes. For instance, in Coleman v. Commissioner,
a sale-leaseback case, the court ignored the business motivations of the
seller-lessee (which claimed that it entered into the transaction because of
179. 902 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990), vacating 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1988).
180. Id. at 160.
181. Id. at 162.
182. Id. at 163 (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84 (1978)).
183. Id. at 163.
184. Id. (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576).
185. Id.
186. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. See also Reply Br. of Resp‘t at 291-93, Santa
Monica Pictures, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (No. 6163-03) (citing
and applying Newman, 902 F.2d 159); cf. Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 83 (finding a non-tax
business purpose lacking by examining effects on both taxpayer and counterparty).
187. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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cash needs to remain financially viable), noting that the relevant motive
was that of the lessor-partnership of which the taxpayer was a partner.188
This is the opposite of the approach taken by the courts in Newman and
Frank Lyon, which allowed the taxpayer in those cases to ―borrow‖
business purpose from third parties in order to meet the requirements of
economic substance.189
2.

Confusion in Application to Pass-through Entities

The business purpose analysis runs into related difficulties in cases
involving pass-through entity taxpayers. In such situations, the question
that arises is whether the business purpose analysis should occur at the
entity level or at the level of the respective owners of the entity. For
example, if the entity is a partnership, and if the analysis looks at the
partners of the partnership, bootstrapping might inadvertently occur
because the partners may include both the party ultimately attempting to
minimize its tax liability or claim a tax benefit and a facilitating ―third
party‖ partner.190
The contingent installment sales cases, which were constructed to
shelter capital gains of corporate taxpayers by employing the operation of
the contingent installment sales regulations, provide an example of the
inconsistency and confusion that comes with evaluating a third-party
relationship‘s impact on the business purpose analysis.191 An examination
of these cases shows that even within the same ―family‖ of tax shelter
cases, different courts give the motivations of these participants different
weights in determining the bona fides of a given transaction. As discussed
in Part II.A,192 these transactions involved the formation of a partnership
between a domestic and a foreign partner.193 Using contributions from the
partners, the partnership would purchase property (private placement
notes), hold it for a short period of time, and then sell the property in
exchange for a large, immediate cash payment and small future contingent
payments (LIBOR notes).194 This sale of private placement notes for cash
188. 16 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1994) (―Although [the seller-lessee‘s] motive appears
genuine, we place little significance on this factor because [the lessor limited partnership‘s]
motive is the relevant one.‖).
189. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576-78; Newman, 902 F.2d at 163.
190. See, e.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231 (partners were a company seeking to generate
capital losses and a ―facilitating‖ Dutch bank).
191. Id.; Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d 625; Saba, 273 F.3d 1135; ASA Investerings, 201
F.3d 505.
192. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
193. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 628; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136; ASA Investerings, 201
F.3d at 506; ACM, 157 F.3d at 234-35.
194. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 628-29; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1138; ASA Investerings,
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and LIBOR notes would trigger the application of the ratable basis
recovery rule in the regulations.195 This rule would allow present year gain
to be allocated to the foreign partner, while future yearly losses would be
allocated to the domestic partner to offset that domestic partner‘s gains
from other activities after the foreign partner‘s withdrawal from the
partnership.196 Merrill Lynch, the promoter, was involved not merely in
structuring the transactions but also in seeking out the foreign partner,
ABN Bank based in the Netherlands, to participate in the transaction, and
matching willing taxpayers with ABN Bank.197
The CINS courts were inconsistent in how they applied the business
purpose prong of the economic substance doctrine with respect to the
participation of ABN Bank. For example, in ASA Investerings, the tax
court found that the partnership (ASA) was a sham partnership, focusing on
ABN Bank‘s lack of business purpose rather than on AlliedSignal, the
entity seeking to offset its gains. The tax court first determined that the
issue was ―whether AlliedSignal and ABN intended to join together in the
present conduct of an enterprise.‖198 The court then found that the
partnership was not a true partnership because the partners had ―divergent
business goals‖—AlliedSignal‘s goal was to generate capital losses, while
ABN Bank‘s ―sole purpose‖ for entering into the partnership was
―receiving its specified return.‖199 The court proceeded to look more
closely at ABN‘s participation, noting that ―ABN [had no] profit potential
beyond its specified return and did not have any intention of being

201 F.3d at 508; ACM, 157 F.3d at 235-36.
195. I.R.C. § 453 (2006); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453–1(c)(3)(i) (1981).
196. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 627; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136; ASA Investerings, 201
F.3d at 507—08; ACM, 157 F.3d at 237.
197. Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136, 1138; ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 508; ACM, 157 F.3d at
235, 235 n. 5; Saba P‘ship v. Comm‘r, Nos. 1470-97, 1471-97, 1999 WL 974834, at *4, *89 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 27, 1999); ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 326-27 (1998);
ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2194. The CINS cases represent a set of tax shelter
transactions whose success is dependent upon the participation of unrelated party
participants. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. There were two clear junctures
at which unrelated party participation was instrumental in triggering the desired tax
consequences. First, the acquisition of the private placement notes from unrelated parties
and their almost immediate sale to other unrelated parties partially in exchange for a
contingent instrument was the triggering tax event that allowed the Section 453 regulations
to be applied in the first place. Second, the participation and subsequent withdrawal of a tax
neutral foreign partner (ABN Bank) in each of these partnerships was essential in order for
the gain from the PPN-for-cash-and-LIBOR-notes exchange to be allocated to that foreign
partner with the subsequent loss being allocated to the taxpayer trying to offset its capital
gains. The analysis of third parties by the CINS courts focused on the second juncture
rather than the first: the participation of ABN Bank, the tax neutral foreign partner.
198. ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 333 (citing Comm‘r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733, 742 (1949) and Maiatico v. Comm‘r, 183 F.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
199. Id.
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AlliedSignal‘s partner.‖200 The court also noted that ―ABN would not bear
any loss relating to the PPN sale‖ and ―ABN was a compliant and
accommodating party, which was chosen for the venture because it was
willing to serve at AlliedSignal‘s direction.‖201 By focusing on ABN Bank,
the court concluded that these features were ―contrary to the characteristics
of a bona fide partnership‖ and that the partnership was therefore a sham
entity.202
Even though it ultimately affirmed the tax court‘s determination that
the partnership was a sham and that the parties did not intend to join
together to conduct non-tax avoidance business activities, the court of
appeals in ASA Investerings found it ―curious‖ and ―puzzling‖ that the tax
court‘s focus was on ABN‘s intentions. The appeals court found this
curious because ―the absence of a nontax business purpose was even
clearer for AlliedSignal‖ and ―AlliedSignal . . . was the driving force and . .
. focused on tax minimization to the virtual exclusion of ordinary business
goals.‖203 Thus, unlike the tax court, the appeals court thought that the
focus of the sham partnership inquiry should be on AlliedSignal, the
corporation seeking to offset its capital losses, rather than ABN Bank, the
foreign partner.
Inconsistency regarding which party to look at in evaluating business
purpose was also evident in Boca Investerings.204 In determining whether
the partnership was a sham entity, the court of appeals in Boca
Investerings, like the courts in ASA Investerings, looked for the existence of
a nontax business purpose.205 However, the Boca Investerings court
appeared confused over which party to look at in evaluating the existence
of such business purpose. On the one hand, the court implied that the
existence of nontax business purposes should be determined at the partner
level, looking at the needs and intentions of both partners.206 On the other
hand, the court‘s analysis of whether a nontax business purpose existed
focused on American Home Products (AHP)—the partner seeking to offset
capital losses.207 After analyzing AHP‘s business purposes, the appeals

200. Id.
201. Id. at 334-35.
202. Id. at 335.
203. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 513, 515.
204. See generally Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d 625.
205. Id. at 630 (―As we noted in Saba Partnership, ‗ASA makes clear that the absence of
a nontax business purpose is fatal to the argument that the Commissioner should respect an
entity for federal tax purposes.‘‖) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id. at 631-32 (―In order to satisfy the legal test for this type of partnership, the
district court must have found a non-tax business purpose need for the partnership in order
to accomplish the goals of the partners.‖).
207. Id. at 631 (―Without a finding on the business need for the partnership from AHP‘s
standpoint in this transaction, the judgment under review cannot stand.‖).
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court found that the partnership in question was a sham entity.208 By way
of comparison, the district court in Boca Investerings looked at the
intentions of both AHP and ABN Bank in determining that the partnership
was not a sham.209
Just as they disagreed with regard to which entity‘s motivations and
economic effects to focus on in determining whether a CINS partnership
was a sham, the CINS courts also failed to agree as to whether the
applicable analysis to these transactions should be a ―sham entity‖ analysis
or a ―sham transaction‖ analysis. While some of the CINS courts applied a
―sham entity‖ analysis, others applied a ―sham transaction‖ analysis, and
some applied both.210 The CINS courts even appeared to disagree on
whether the sham entity and sham transaction analyses yielded different
results.211
The determination of whether to apply a ―sham transaction‖ or a
―sham entity‖ analysis is significant because application of the sham entity
analysis allowed some CINS courts to look through the entity to the
intentions of the partners in determining whether the entity was a sham.
For example, the fact that it was performing a sham entity analysis led the
ASA Investerings tax court to look at the divergent business goals of ABN
and AlliedSignal.212 Notably, the district court in Boca Investerings, which
performed both a sham transaction and a sham partnership analysis, seemed
208. Id. at 631-32 (―AHP‘s participation in the partnership defies common sense from an
economic standpoint, since it could have purchased the PPNs and the LIBOR notes directly,
and avoided millions in transaction costs . . . . In this case, there is no evidence of any need
for AHP to enter into the . . . partnership with the newly-minted Addiscombe and Syringa in
order to invest in the LIBOR notes and PPNs.‖).
209. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 369-73 (―AHP would only enter into a
partnership with a partner or partners with whom AHP would be comfortable, who had
expertise with respect to the financial instruments . . . and who was financially secure. . . .
While [the ABN Bank SPCs] hedged their share of the interest-rate risk with respect to the
LIBOR Notes outside the Partnership, this did not affect the sharing of such risk among the
partners.‖).
210. The appeals court in Boca Investerings, and the tax court and appeals court in ASA
Investerings, applied a ―sham entity‖ analysis. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 630; ASA
Investerings, 201 F.3d at 512; ASA Investerings P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325,
333-34 (1998). The tax court and appeals court in ACM Partnership and the tax court in
Saba Partnership applied a ―sham transaction‖ analysis. ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d at 245;
Saba, at *41-*42; ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2214-15 (1997). The district court
in Boca Investerings applied both a ―sham entity‖ and a ―sham transaction‖ analysis. Boca
Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 364. The appeals court in Saba Partnership remanded, on
the theory that both analyses needed to be considered. Saba, 273 F.3d at 1140-41.
211. Compare ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d 505, 512, 512 n.4 (―Although the Tax Court
said that it would not consider whether the transactions at issue lacked ‗economic
substance‘ . . . its decision rejecting the bona fides of the partnership was the equivalent of a
finding that it was . . . a sham.‖), with Saba, 273 F.3d at 1140 (―All parties agree that the
sham transaction and sham partnership approaches yield different results.‖).
212. ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, rev‟d, 201 F.3d 505.
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to take a different approach for each analysis.213 In its sham partnership
analysis, the district court in Boca Investerings looked at the intents of and
relationships between all of the partners, including the ABN subsidiaries.214
On the other hand, in its sham transaction analysis, the court looked at
profitability and business purpose almost exclusively from American Home
Products‘ point of view.215 Therefore, the type of analysis the court
chooses to undertake apparently has a significant effect.
*****
The confusion in ―business purpose‖ jurisprudence, both in cases
involving pass-through entities and in other cases, is concerning. Such
inconsistencies present uncertainty as to the parameters of the business
purpose doctrine and which version of the business purpose analysis the
courts will apply. They also suggest that rogue versions of the doctrine
may evolve and be applied in inaccurate ways as third-party participation in
avoidance transactions continues to grow and change. Such inaccuracies,
even subtle ones, may undermine the doctrine‘s effectiveness in accurately
evaluating the transactions and relationships between taxpayers and third
parties—the very relationships the doctrine is meant to probe.
V.

BEYOND ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE: TWO PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE
IMPACTS OF TAXPAYER RELATIONSHIPS IN SHELTER CASES

Thus far, this Article has summarized the integral roles played by
relationships and dealings with third parties in the structuring of tax
transactions and has shown how existing judicial anti-abuse doctrines that
are applied in shelter cases are, at core, concerned with evaluation of such
relationships. However, this Article has also shown that judicial anti-abuse
doctrines are not cure-alls, that judicial analyses are not uniformly robust,
and that even courts that perform detailed analyses could do better by
providing explicit discussions and narratives analyzing such effects. The
inadequate application of the traditional doctrines that probe the substance,
the risk involved, or the economic effects of tax minimization transactions
is exacerbated in part by two factors: the continuing resonance of the
Frank Lyon presumption and the increasing ease of forming more complex
and sophisticated entities and relationships.216
Furthermore, this Article has shown that the presence of third-party
relationships in shelter cases causes two other problems: (1) adverse
213.
214.
215.
216.

Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
Id. at 367-74.
Id. at 374-81.
See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B.
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impacts on evidentiary transparency that circumscribe the narratives to
which courts and other commentators have access in tax litigation
proceedings and that compromise judicial ability to fully evaluate the
factual realities of the transactions at issue; and (2) doctrinal obfuscation
(and correspondingly, subtle modification) in applications of the traditional
anti-abuse doctrines to complex, relationship-driven transactions.
To remedy these issues, this section presents two normative proposals.
First, courts should apply a carefully constructed oppositional choice
analysis in evaluating third-party relationships and their consequences in
tax shelter cases in order to offset the problems associated with lack of
transparency and asymmetric information. Such an analysis will help
strengthen traditional doctrines in their analysis of ongoing relationships
between players. It will also help alleviate the evidentiary problems caused
by non-transparent relationships and their accompanying incentives.
Second, courts should rehabilitate the business purpose doctrine from the
doctrinal confusion caused by increasingly complex relationships between
taxpayers and others. This can help prevent courts from applying
traditional doctrines in unintended and unanticipated ways that weaken
their ultimate effectiveness.
A.

The Need for an Explicitly Expressed, Oppositional-Choice Analysis
of Taxpayer Relationships

The need for a ―deeper look‖ at the meanings and effects of
relationships between taxpayers and third parties, in terms of both
substance and procedure, is central to this Article‘s first proposal. So, too,
is the need for clear judicial expression of their evaluations of these
relationships. As other scholars have argued, the content of judicial
opinions is significant for reasons other than simply determining the
outcome of a case.217 Judicial opinion writing in tax shelter cases can and
should play an active role in guiding judicial choice and in shedding light
upon the nuances of relationships in shelter cases.
Since it is generally not feasible to ban business transactions and
relationship formation outright on an ex ante basis,218 this Article suggests a
217. See Susan Bandes, Searching for Worlds beyond the Canon: Narrative, Rhetoric,
and Legal Change, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 281 (2003) (―The [judicial] aura of
authority and inevitability is achieved largely by the very refusal to acknowledge alternative
viewpoints.‖); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as
Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 747 (2006) (―[J]udicial opinions serve as a
form of informational regulation of judicial behavior.‖). See also Alex Geisinger, A Belief
Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002) (articulating a ―belief
change‖ theory of how law affects social norms and discussing law‘s ―expressive‖
function).
218. Some provisions have been enacted to discourage third-party participants from
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―best practices‖ approach to analyzing and speaking about the relationships
that are formed. This Article proposes that when making decisions in
shelter transactions involving third-party relationships, courts should
explicitly recognize the ultimate indeterminacy of any transaction or
relationship, whether between unrelated parties or not. Courts can do this
by treating the decisional matrix confronting them as a choice between
which of two diametrically opposite analytical possibilities is more
apposite. For example, a judicial intuition that a transaction occurred at
arm‘s length should only be allowed to hold sway after a corresponding
determination that the parties did not collude in setting prices and did not
have the incentive to do so. Likewise, a judicial determination that a
transaction with a third party reflects the existence of genuine obligations
should only be made after a clear determination that there are no unwritten
understandings that undercut the existence of such economic effects.
In other words, this Article suggests that courts should make
determinations regarding relationships and transactions between taxpayers
and third parties by employing an explicitly expressed oppositional-choice
process. Such a process would involve a court asking a list of ―back-and
forth‖ questions in determining the true substance of a relationship and
making its decision. The questions asked should be organic, tailored to the
specific situation presented, and adjusted to accommodate the changing
realities of the shelter market. For example, the analysis could look like
this:
Legitimizing:

Is this a genuine transaction between multiple parties that
are unrelated?

Detractive:

If there are third parties involved in the transaction, do they
merely serve as straws or mules to give the transaction a
credible flavor?

Legitimizing:

Do the transactions, relationships, and agreements between
the taxpayer and the third party reflect the existence of
genuine obligations that have economic effects?

Detractive:

Are the legal obligations or economic effects we think we
observe undercut by unwritten understandings or side
agreements that may not be obvious to the observer?

engaging in abusive tax planning transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4965 (2006) (imposing an
excise tax on certain tax-exempt entities entering into prohibited shelter transactions); I.R.C.
§ 6652(c) (2006) (imposing penalties on tax-exempt entity for failure to disclose
participation in certain prohibited transactions).
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Legitimizing:

Did the transactions, relationships, and agreements
between the parties result in a shifting in benefits and
burdens of ownership, and does the new owner take on
risk?

Detractive:

Is there any evidence of countervailing factors (such as
offsetting transactions) that undercut burden shifting or
eliminate the risks of ownerships?

Legitimizing:

Was the pricing of the transaction at arm’s length and at
fair value?

Detractive:

Is there evidence of collusion or price setting between the
parties? Is there any suggestion that pricing was set to
achieve a certain level of tax benefits?

Legitimizing:

Were the agreements and prior relationships between
taxpayer and third party transparently presented, readily
accessible, and observable to the administrative and/or
judicial fact finder?

Detractive:

Do the taxpayer and third-party players have an incentive
to misrepresent, hide, or withhold information from the
judicial fact finder, such that we should look at the facts
presented to us with a suspicious eye?

In this manner, making a realistic determination of the true nature or
the real economics of a third party‘s participation would require judges to
overcome increasing transactional complexity and existing presumptions of
respect toward unrelated party transactions. They would also need to
perform a considered analysis of the underlying historic and continuing
commercial, business, or personal relationships and transactions between
the taxpayer and third parties, and to come to an in-depth understanding of
what behaviors are incentivized by these relationships. In doing so, the
analysis deliberately takes on an implicit forward and backward looking
dimension.
The process and results of the above oppositional-choice analysis
should be made an explicit part of judicial opinions by introducing a
mandatory new section as part of the factual description provided in the
opinion text. This notion of modifying judicial opinion format is not new
and has been suggested elsewhere.219 The notion is also not outrageous.
219. See Oldfather, supra note 217, at 748, 794-801 (arguing that format of judicial
opinions should be modified to include ―‗framing arguments‘–party-generated statements of
the issues before the court‖ in order to facilitate better regulation of judicial behavior).
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After all, judges already customarily included certain sections in their
opinion—such sections most often include a summary of prior proceedings,
a summary of the facts, a statement of the legal issue, a summary of the
applicable doctrine, and the like. Making a slight change in opinion format
and coverage in order to facilitate more thorough fact finding on a critical
matter should not be difficult or controversial.
It should be noted that the last two ―oppositions‖ in the oppositionalchoice analysis described above are of particular importance. They extend
the inquiry to the question of how underlying and hidden relationships
affect transparency and disclosure in order to remedy the potential
evidentiary imbalances discussed in Part IV.A. As that Part points out,
third-party relationships can have serious effects on these matters.220
To sum things up, engaging in this back-and-forth analysis between
legitimizing and detractive interpretations, and expressly including the
process and results of such analysis in the opinion text, serves a number of
purposes.221 First, it aids judicial analysis. It forces courts to pay close
attention to the relationships underlying a shelter transaction in the first
place instead of being overly influenced by how a transaction (particularly
a transaction between unrelated parties) is papered and presented, giving
courts a better chance not to be led astray by one-sided accounts and
information asymmetries.222 It also gives courts a better chance of
understanding how the ongoing nature of some relationships may impact
the determination of whether a transaction has substance or is a sham.
Balanced relationship analysis and the crafting of explicit expository
opinions by lower courts also aids appellate review, providing appeals
courts with a more solid and transparent framework for understanding the
relationships underlying appealed shelter cases.223 An oppositional-choice
approach to relationship analysis is also useful because it mirrors the way
in which evidence is discovered and introduced into the record in tax
litigation.224 Typically, the taxpayer (and third parties in the taxpayer‘s
220. See supra Part IV.A.
221. Some of the goals, purposes, and functions of judicial explication are explored in
related literature concerning the roles and goals of judicial opinion writing. See Bandes,
supra note 217, at 281 (―[J]udicial narratives are under tremendous pressure to be
hegemonic.‖); Oldfather, supra note 217, at 795 (―Conceiving of opinions as a form of
informational regulation both invites and facilitates consideration of how the opinion device
might be modified to direct judicial behavior.‖); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995) (discussing
reasons for, constraints on, principles underlying, and techniques associated with judicial
writing).
222. Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1076.
223. My thanks to Jason Reichlyn for highlighting this point.
224. See generally TAX CT. R. PRAC. P. 70-104 (2010) (discovery rules generally
applicable to proceedings of the United States Tax Court). See also I.R.C. § 7453 (2006);
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-53 (discovery and trial rules generally applicable in the federal district
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corner) will endeavor to put forth the most legitimizing spin possible on the
record and the IRS will introduce maximally detractive interpretations of
the same transaction.225 Courts are left with the difficult task of sorting out
the conflicting relationship depictions of already complex transactions that
each side tries to present. By engaging in an oppositional-choice analysis,
courts will be better able to appreciate and evaluate the existence, strength,
and veracity of the arguments and counterarguments put forth by the
parties, instead of being unduly swayed by the point of view put forward by
one side.
In addition, such an approach has the potential to change the behavior
of players even in times leading up to a tax trial. If the parties to a tax case
(i.e., taxpayer, third parties, and IRS) know that courts will always be
looking deeply and in an analytically oppositional way at the content of
third-party relationships, this can have the effect of encouraging more
robust discovery and disclosure at the administrative and trial level, thereby
ameliorating some of the transparency and observability problems pointed
out in this Article. For example, this could encourage more aggressive and
thorough subpoenaing and questioning of counterparties in tax cases, which
could, in turn, have the effect of discouraging potential counterparties from
―helping out‖ in transactions that lack substance in the first place. And, if
parties are aware, ex ante, that courts will be exploring a broad range of
analytical possibilities with respect to the relationships before them (not
just the narrow economic effects of the present transaction), this may even
have the effect of imposing costs that serve to discourage third parties from
entering into the most aggressive kinds of relationship formation to begin
with.
Finally, adopting an oppositional choice analysis that is explicitly
expressed in judicial opinions has the effect of harnessing judicial decisionmaking as a tool for educating the public and raising awareness about the
nature and extent of underlying relationships between taxpayers and third
parties and their significance in facilitating shelter transactions. As
previously noted, a problem with observing relationship formation and
transactions between parties in the commercial context in general, and in
the tax shelter context in particular, is the hidden nature, complexity, and
non-intuitiveness of the (non-human) legal personages, contracts, and the
relationships that arise between them.226 This concealment and complexity
courts).
225. See Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1075 (describing the Supreme Court‘s reliance in
tax cases ―on the validity of a basic assumption of the adversary process: that strong and
effective advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments for each
side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result‖). As noted, this adversary
process is often, in fact, fraught with information and power asymmetries. See supra notes
160, 172 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM.
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is particularly stark as compared to the more ―obvious‖ interactions
between easily observable human persons. Indeed, the question about the
proper relationship that should exist between the human and non-human
legal persons (and the proper treatment of each) is arguably one of the
important questions of our time.227 The problems of concealment and nonintuitiveness are often exacerbated by information and other asymmetries
between the taxing authority (and the public) and the sophisticated taxpayer
in the tax litigation context.228 If the idea is to prevent abusive tax
planning, then stimulating public, judicial, administrative, and legislative
awareness about the underlying complex commercial relationships that so
often facilitate such planning can only be a good thing.
Judicial adoption of an oppositional choice analysis of third-party
relationships will help achieve all three of the stated goals. A judicial
solution is required because judges are in the best position to facilitate
narratives and explanations of the relationships between parties and to raise
awareness about the effects of relationality in shelter transactions. Because
the significance of third-party relationships extends beyond the traditional
economic substance assessment and encompasses issues of evidentiary
transparency, behavioral incentives, and the need for raising awareness, a
statutory or regulatory solution by itself is insufficient.
Yet the question remains: should judges in tax cases be charged with
making in-depth evaluations of the business and commercial relationships
between third parties? On the one hand, given the importance of thirdparty relationships in affecting the timing, amount, and location of tax
benefit realization, it is hard to see why not. Arguably, analyzing the
merits of a claimed relationship is precisely what courts are doing in
situations where they apply so-called ―factors‖ tests.229 On the other hand,
there are contravening administrative and philosophical considerations.
Probing the nuances of underlying relationships can be labor-intensive,
time consuming, and an ill-suited use of scarce judicial expertise and
BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009) (arguing that the erosion of the ―doctrine of secret liens‖ led to an
―opaque credit environment‖ that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008).
227. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(protecting political spending by unions and corporations as free speech under the First
Amendment).
228. See Rostain, supra note 72, at 83-95 (describing role of private tax bar in growth of
tax shelters); Schizer, supra note 172, at 331 (noting that tax shelters ―also derive from a
structural imbalance in our tax system‖ whereby ―the private tax bar outmatches its
counterpart in government‖); Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1076 (noting that, in the Frank
Lyon litigation, ―[t]he weakness of government counsel was no match for the strength of
taxpayer counsel‖ and urging ―serious reconsideration‖ to the ―assumptions‖ of the
―adversary system‖ and ―process‖).
229. See Levine v. Comm‟r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-86 (2005) (applying factors test in
determining whether taxpayer was common law employee or independent contractor, for
purposes of determining deductibility of pension play contribution).
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resources.230 Underlying relationships that extend beyond the transaction at
issue may also be difficult to discern based on the record, which would
most likely be focused on the discrete tax avoidance transaction being
litigated. And, ultimately, probing the underlying commercial relationships
between the parties might require too much independent judicial
investigation. The question of how thoroughly judges should look into the
underlying relationships between third parties also raises philosophical
issues: ultimately, this question implicates the broader issue of how
closely, and in what circumstances, courts should scrutinize and intervene
in contracts between the parties to a private transaction at all.231 This is
hardly a question limited to tax law adjudication.232
Despite these countervailing considerations, however, this Article
contends that judges in tax cases absolutely should inquire more explicitly
into the business and personal relationships between the taxpayer and the
third party. Tax law is fundamentally concerned with probing the true
economics and substance of transactions rather than accepting their form at
face value,233 and tax shelters raise serious problems of social justice in that
they thwart attempts to raise revenue and create revenue leakage.234 Insofar
as we want to discourage the formation of sham relationships acceptable in
form but lacking substance, this overriding concern with substance—a
230. See generally Oldfather, supra note 217, at 768-79 (discussing the ―crisis of
volume‖ affecting federal appellate courts and the effects on court performance); Stephen
Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary is it Anyway?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing
for increase in size of judiciary); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 273, 277 (1996) (arguing that size of judiciary needs to be increased to cope with
effects of increasing caseloads).
231. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (ruling that New York statute
―interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees, concerning the
number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer‖). See also
Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner‟s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 333-42 (1995) (describing ―the pattern of
reinvigoration and retreat‖ in Supreme Court‘s economic rights jurisprudence); David A.
Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (criticizing the
Lochner court for ―treat[ing] freedom of contract as a cornerstone of the constitutional order
and systematically undervalued reasons for limiting or overriding the right‖).
232. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001)
(determining that securitized receivables were part of debtor‘s estate; rejecting
characterization of attempted securitization transaction as a ―true sale‖). See generally
Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Treatment of Fraudulent Conveyance Cases
Involving Leveraged Buyouts, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 552, 554 (1993) (arguing that ―since the
judicial inquiry employed in constructive fraudulent conveyance/LBO cases is driven as
much by equity as by law, bankruptcy courts should be free to fashion a creative equitable
remedy in order to better balance the competing interests of lenders and unsecured
creditors‖).
233. See supra Part III.A (describing doctrines that do this).
234. See supra note 5.
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concern central to tax analysis—more than offsets philosophical concerns
surrounding the freedom to contract. In fact, the underlying assumption
that contracts between the unrelated parties to a market transaction are
somehow worthier of respect by their very nature is exactly the type of
assumption that should be interrogated with the deep and explicit analysis
suggested by this Article.
B.

A Necessary Rehabilitation of the Business Purpose Doctrine

In addition to adopting an explicitly oppositional-choice analysis, the
evaluation of business purpose as part of judicial anti-abuse analysis needs
to be reconsidered. As shown in Part IV.B, the application of the business
purpose prong of the economic substance doctrine has been inconsistently
developed and applied with respect to third parties. The confusion in thirdparty jurisprudence is of particular significance in situations where the
taxpayer lacks a valid business purpose but is seeking to ―bootstrap‖ the
business purpose of the third party in order to satisfy the requirement.235
And the roles that third-party business purposes play are especially
inchoate in the context of pass-through entities or ventures, or in
evaluations of whether an entity, rather than a transaction, is a sham.236
The rehabilitation recommended by this Article has two aspects: first,
courts should clarify that the only situations in which the business
motivations of a third party can possibly be bootstrapped are situations
where the third party is actually prevented by law or by regulation from
conducting the transaction in the non-abusive way suggested by the court.
Second, in situations involving relationships entered into through passthrough entities, courts need to adopt a realistic view of which legal person
is the taxpayer. That is, in determining whose business purposes to
―count,‖ the deciding factor is not whose name is on the pleading (or who
―owns‖ the entity listed) but rather whose tax liability is ultimately being
minimized. Both of these aspects of the proposed doctrinal rehabilitation
235. Situations where the taxpayer concededly possesses a business purpose but a thirdparty participant in the transaction lacks a business purpose also raise interesting questions.
Recent scholarship has focused on the effects of how ―the transaction‖ is framed. This
scholarship argues that the framing of a transaction as either broadly or narrowly defined
has the capacity to affect a finding of economic substance or business purpose. See Hariton,
supra note 124. See also Gray Jennings, Economic Substance and the Taxpayer‟s Purpose,
127 TAX NOTES 535, 537 (2010) (suggesting that ―the common law of economic substance
be framed so that a step has economic substance if the taxpayer‘s purpose for the step is to
contribute to realizing a nontax objective of the taxpayer‖). Along these lines, in situations
where, as a threshold matter, the taxpayer is initially thought to have a business purpose but
the third party does not, re-framing the transaction to include only the part of the transaction
designed to minimize taxes may lead to an outcome in which neither the taxpayer nor the
third party is found to have a non-tax business purpose.
236. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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must take place in dialogue with the changes to the economic substance
doctrine resulting from its recent codification by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.237
1.

Adoption of an ―Actual Prevention‖ Standard

Should bootstrapping of third-party business purpose be permitted to
salvage transactions where the taxpayer lacks a business purpose? This is
apparently permissible under the logic of Frank Lyon.238 However, the
recent and much-debated239 codification of the economic substance doctrine
has arguably rendered such bootstrapping impermissible.240 New §
7701(o), which is titled a ―[c]larification of [the] economic substance
doctrine,‖ contains the following general rule:
(1) Application of doctrine. In the case of any transaction to
which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such
transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only
if—
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic
position, and
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from
Federal income
tax effects) for entering into such
transaction.241
The term ―transaction‖ is defined to include ―a series of
transactions.‖242 However, the term ―taxpayer‖ is not defined by statute.
At first blush, the wording of Code Section 7701(o)(1)(B) suggests that the
focus of the business purpose analysis should be on whether ―the taxpayer‖
237. See Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (applying to
transactions entered into after March 30, 2010).
238. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576 (suggesting that the taxpayer need not be
motivated by non-tax considerations as long as the other party to the agreement is so
motivated). See also Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (applying the reasoning in Frank Lyon in
taking third-party motivations into account).
239. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Will Economic Substance Codification Be
Worth It?, 127 TAX NOTES 16 (Apr. 5, 2010) (discussing practitioners‘ criticisms of the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010); Jeremiah Coder, Panelists Divided
on Effects of Economic Substance Codification, 127 TAX NOTES 252 (Apr. 19, 2010)
(summarizing some practitioners‘ differing thoughts on the effects of the codification of
economic substance in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010); Monte
Jackel, Dawn of a New Era: Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 127 TAX NOTES 289
(Apr. 19, 2010) (discussing the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 and
identifying several areas in which guidance is needed); Jennings, supra note 235.
240. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 1409(a), 124 Stat. at 1067-68
(applying to transactions entered into after March 30, 2010).
241. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1) (West 2010).
242. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(5)(D) (West 2010).
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has a ―substantial purpose‖ for engaging in the transaction, and that the
analysis should therefore not take into account the motivations of third
parties. However, this formulation may merely beg the follow-up question:
does helping a third party fulfill a non-tax business purpose in a way that
happens to yield favorable tax consequences for the taxpayer/helper
constitute a ―substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects)‖
of the taxpayer/helper for purposes of Code Section 7701(o)(1)(B)? The
answer is not clear and probably will not be clear until such a fact pattern
actually comes before the courts.243
In light of this uncertainty, this Article proposes a simple threshold
rule: since adverse judicial decisions in tax shelter cases amount to
denying one set of claimed tax results and reallocating tax items in
accordance with the ―true substance‖ of the transaction, the third party‘s
business purposes should only be considered if the third party is actually
prevented by legal or regulatory requirements from entering into the ―true
substance‖ transaction suggested or envisioned by the court.
Frank Lyon would arguably satisfy this standard: in Frank Lyon, the
tax transaction was a sale-leaseback transaction, but the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the benefits and burdens taken on by the taxpayer were ―too
insubstantial‖ to cause taxpayer to be the true owner of the bank
building.244 Logically, the ―true substance‖ of the transaction was that the
bank owned the building. However, the bank was ―actually prevented‖ by
Arkansas law from owning the building.245 Under the proposed rule, the
bank‘s business purposes could be considered. Newman, on the other hand,
would not satisfy the test because the non-tax business purposes motivating
the trucking company consisted merely of ―financial reasons‖ and a
concern with making ―the best decision for [the] company‖ and these
―financial reasons‖ basically amounted to a mere business preference to
leave the trucks at issue off of the trucking company‘s balance sheet.246
The mere business preference in Newman is distinguishable from the
express disallowance by state and federal laws and regulations in Frank
Lyon.247
This Article does not suggest that a legitimate non-tax business
purpose exists under § 7701(o) in every case in which a taxpayer has no
non-tax business purposes but is assisting a third party that is being
thwarted by legal or regulatory constraints. Some such situations may still
be found to fail the business purpose requirement, depending on the facts
243. Cf. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 514 n.6 (―[T]he desire to aid another party in tax
avoidance is no more a business purpose than actually engaging in tax avoidance.‖).
244. Frank Lyon, 536 F.3d at 754, rev‟d 435 U.S. 561.
245. Id. at 563-64.
246. Newman, 902 F.2d at 163.
247. Compare Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563-64, with Newman, 902 F.2d at 163.
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and circumstances surrounding the transaction.248 The standard proposed
by this Article is, rather, a threshold requirement, albeit a high one.
However, a high standard is appropriate because situations where the
taxpayer does not have a business purpose and is seeking to ―latch on‖ to a
third party‘s purposes in order to vindicate a transaction already represent a
marginal case. A rule that accepts the mere fact of third-party business
preferences as sufficient to endow such substance would open the door to
jurisprudential uncertainty and taxpayer abuses.
2.

A Realistic Approach to Relationships Via Pass-Through Entities

In addition to setting a high bar for determining which third-party
business purposes suffice, courts also need to formulate a more consistent
and nuanced analysis of whose business purposes ―count‖ in the context of
relationships intermediated through pass-through entity taxpayers. In other
words, courts should seek a consistent answer to the question, ―Who is the
taxpayer?‖ for purposes of applying the business purpose inquiry to passthrough entities.
In this regard, it should be noted that the recent codification of the
economic substance doctrine does not help answer the ―Who is the
taxpayer?‖ question.249 As discussed, the ―business purpose‖ prong of the
new provision requires that ―the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart
from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction‖ in
order for the transaction to have substance, and the term ―taxpayer‖ is not
defined in the statute.250 Therefore, in situations where ―the taxpayer‖ is a
pass-through entity such as a partnership, it is still an open question
whether the existence of a business purpose should be determined at the
entity level or on the partner/member level on a look-through basis.
This Article argues that ―the taxpayer‖ should be read in a
commonsense way to mean the party that ultimately is seeking to minimize
its tax liability or to utilize the tax benefit, whether or not such goal is
accomplished through a pass-through entity (or chains of pass-through
entities). Correspondingly, the party listed on the litigation pleading or the
case name is not necessarily ―the taxpayer‖ for purposes of the business
purpose inquiry. Other members or partners of the listed party should be
considered ―third parties,‖ rather than taxpayers, for purposes of the
248. For example, this would be the case if the third party satisfies the ―actual
prevention‖ test but the transaction lacks economic substance; or, for example, if it is found
that satisfaction of the ―actual prevention‖ was specifically engineered by the taxpayer.
249. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (applying to transactions entered into after March
30, 2010).
250. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (West 2010) (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying notes 240-243.
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analysis.
For example, in ACM Partnership, the entity named as the taxpayer in
the litigation was the partnership (the pass-through entity) itself.251 The
partners in that partnership were the corporate parent entity seeking to
offset its capital losses, the facilitating third-party foreign bank, and a
subsidiary of the promoter, Merrill Lynch.252 The fact that the partnership
was the named taxpayer gave rise to confusion with respect to whose
business purposes deserved attention, particularly in cases where a ―sham
entity‖ (rather than a ―sham transaction‖) analysis was applied. The
application of a ―sham entity‖ analysis in some of those cases in effect
provided the courts with a pathway to looking at the intentions of both of
the partnership‘s partners in assessing the existence of a business purpose,
rather than focusing, as it should have, on the party seeking the favorable
tax consequences.253 Under the standard proposed in this Article, ―the
taxpayer‖ would in all circumstances be considered to be the U.S. corporate
partner seeking to minimize tax liability, while the facilitating taxindifferent foreign bank would be considered a third party.
It might be argued that looking at the third party‘s business purposes
in the pass-through context is justified. After all, in entering into a partner
relationship with the tax avoider, the third party in some sense becomes
―less unrelated‖ to the tax avoider than before. If the partnership is a bona
fide partnership, then perhaps taking the third-party partner‘s business
purposes into account is justified. However, framing the issue this way is
circular logic—this approach allows the question of whether a partnership
is a ―sham entity‖ to be answered, in part, based on the motivations of the
third-party partners. Nevertheless, whether the third party is a true partner
(and hence whether its motivations should be considered in the first place)
fundamentally depends on the bona fides of the partnership relationship. In
other words, deciding in advance to allow bootstrapping of the third-party
participant‘s business purposes in effect begs the question that the business
purpose inquiry is supposed to answer. Because of this circularity, it is
clear that looking to a third party‘s business purpose in the pass-through
context is not a solid and independent enough analytical ground upon
which to construct a consistent judicial anti-abuse approach. The question
of how much (or whether) to treat a third-party partner‘s business purpose
as no different from the taxpayer entity‘s business purpose should really be
treated as a secondary and dependent decisional node, one that is
contingent upon a separate initial assessment of whether the partnership
relationship at issue is a sham.
The approach proposed by this Article accords with common sense
251. ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231.
252. Id. at 233-39.
253. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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and realism, and is the correct one for two reasons. First, the alternative
approach (i.e., allowing third-party business motivations to be considered
by looking through the pass-through entity) attaches undue weight upon the
judicial determination of whether to apply the sham entity or the sham
transaction doctrine, or some other anti-abuse doctrine. That is, a judicial
choice to apply a sham entity analysis effectively opens the door wide to
crediting third-party partner business purposes by providing judges with
more cover to do so, whereas a choice to apply a different type of analysis
tends not to have that effect. The fundamental purpose of applying the
judicial anti-abuse doctrines should be to probe deeply and consistently the
economic realities surrounding a tax motivated transaction.254 Applying an
anti-abuse jurisprudence that privileges third-party business purposes to a
greater or lesser extent based on which sham analysis is applied (and that
does not realize the consequences of its approach) defeats this overarching
purpose.
Second, the approach of allowing partner-level business purposes to
―count‖ also places too much weight on the question of which entity gets
named as the taxpayer-petitioner in litigation. This determination is
dependent, in part, on which entity‘s tax return the IRS has examined in the
administrative proceedings below, which is in turn dependent on the
structure of substantive and compliance-related tax law (which may not
have been formulated with this particular issue in mind).255 For example,
the Code‘s rules for examination of partnership returns generally require a
partnership-level determination of the partnership‘s tax items (income, loss,
deductions, credits, etc.) for the sake of administrative convenience.256
These rules were adopted by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (―TEFRA‖) in order to address the administrative and logistical
problems associated with separate examinations of each partner‘s returns.257
Once the partnership-level determination has been made, each partner uses
that partnership-level determination in computing that partner‘s separate

254. See, e.g., Santa Monica, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1190 (describing the judicial antiabuse doctrines as ―particularized judicial doctrines‖ that were ―developed‖ by courts ―[i]n
applying . . . general legal principles‖ of examining substance and statutory intent); see also
United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1983) (―[I]t is immaterial
whether we are talking about ‗substantial economic reality,‘ ‗substance over form,‘ ‗sham‘
transactions, or the like; rather the question is whether under the statute and regulations here
involved the transaction affects a beneficial interest other than the reduction of taxes.‖
(internal citations omitted)).
255. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PARTNERSHIP AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE (2002),
available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/partnerships/article/0,,id=134688,00.html.
256. I.R.C. § 6221–34 (2006) and accompanying Treasury Regulations; see also
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 8.17 (2009)
(describing partnership examination procedures).
257. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as I.R.C. §§ 6221-6234 (2006)).
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tax liability.258 So, for example, if the IRS examined the return of a
corporate taxpayer (C) and the corporate taxpayer was a partner in a
partnership (P), the IRS would generally need to make adjustments to the
P‘s information return under the TEFRA rules in order for those
partnership items to eventually ―hit‖ C‘s tax return. In a subsequent
litigation, the named petitioner would then be P, even though the ultimate
adjustment sought is to C‘s tax picture.259
It is not clear that courts (particularly non-specialist courts) are aware
of the effects of technical rules (such as the TEFRA rules) and other
structural features of IRS administrative proceedings on the broader
outcomes of later tax controversy proceedings, including tax shelter cases.
This is problematic. If judges adopt a jurisprudence that accords weight to
a third-party partner‘s business purpose just because the petitioner in
litigation is the pass-through entity (as opposed to the entity ultimately
seeking to enjoy the tax benefit), this would amount to even greater weight
being put on the rules governing audits and examinations of returns. This
early-stage administrative or congressional decision (which may be based
on rules enacted to meet completely unrelated policy goals)260 would then
have the effect of hamstringing the Treasury or Department of Justice in
later litigation by unintentionally transforming a third-party participant into
a party ―related‖ to the taxpayer. This certainly was not the intention of
procedural rules such as the TEFRA rules.261
In sum, for purposes of applying the business purpose analysis, courts
should apply the commonsense guiding principle that the taxpayer—the
legal person whose business purposes should ―count‖—is the entity seeking
to minimize its tax liability. The relevant question is not which party‘s
name is on the pleading but rather which party is ultimately seeking the tax
benefit of the transaction. The party who ultimately reaps the tax benefits
should be the party whose business purposes are analyzed front and center.
Other entities or facilitating partners are in effect third-party facilitators for
purposes of the business purpose analysis. Their motivations should only
be taken into account in the narrow set of circumstances outlined in Part
V.B.1 above (i.e., where the substance suggested by the court is actually
prevented from occurring by legal or regulatory requirements). Such an
approach is particularly critical in an environment where chains of entities
and parties may be used in effectuating a tax avoidance transaction.
258. I.R.C. § 6222; see also SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 256, ¶ 8.17 (describing the
―unified administrative and judicial proceeding‖ created by TEFRA).
259. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231.
260. The TEFRA rules were most likely not enacted with impacts on judicial anti-abuse
doctrines in mind. See Section of Taxation Proposal as to Audit of Partnerships, 32 TAX
LAW. 551 (1979).
261. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The relational character of tax planning has important impacts on the
structure and outcome of tax shelter litigation beyond the question of
whether a transaction has economic substance. Tax law‘s traditional
focus—through long-standing anti-abuse doctrines—on assessing the risk
or economic substance of a tax transaction is inadequate in managing the
full extent and impacts of the complex commercial and personal
relationships that underlie tax shelter transactions. We are just starting to
grapple with the full effects of such relationships in facilitating tax
evasion.262 This Article has summarized the things we know and do so far,
described why these concepts and measures are inadequate, raised
additional concerns about relationality, and suggested some avenues for
reform.
First, this Article discussed the inadequacies of the traditional antiabuse analyses in probing the bona fides of a tax transaction, arguing that
courts have encountered difficulties for three primary reasons: (1) the
fundamentally indeterminate character of third-party relationships, (2)
certain features of tax doctrine that facilitate complexity and that suggest a
presumption of respect toward unrelated party transactions, and (3) the
inherent artificiality and limitations of the doctrines being applied. It
therefore argued that more explicit and consistent judicial evaluations of
and discussions about such relationships are required. In addition, this
Article has pointed out two other important impacts that relationships with
third parties have in shaping tax shelter litigation: (1) adverse impacts on
evidentiary transparency and observability in tax trial proceedings, and (2)
obfuscatory impacts and warping of the content and application of
substantive doctrine.
To remedy these problems, this Article has offered two normative
proposals designed to change judicial and taxpayer behavior: (1) judicial
application of a clearly and rigorously implemented and explicitly
discussed ―oppositional-choice‖ analysis, and (2) judicial rehabilitation of
the business purpose doctrine from the confusion caused by the
complexities of taxpayer relationality by applying the doctrine in a
common-sense way. Adoption of these proposals will encourage more
accurate judicial determinations of when and whether to respect
relationships between taxpayers and third parties, help raise public
consciousness about the detrimental effects of relationship formation in the
shelter context, discourage taxpayers from engaging in aggressive
relationship formation, and help preserve and encourage proper application
262. See GAO REPORT ON NETWORK TAX EVASION, supra note 10 (September 2010
report discussing effects of networks of related entities in facilitating tax evasion and
discussing barriers that IRS faces in coping with this ―network tax evasion‖).
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of long-standing judicial doctrines in the face of constantly changing and
ever more complex transactions and relationships between persons.
Understanding, describing, and circumscribing the full extent and
impact of the relationality that underlies aggressive tax planning—beyond
the mere application of current substantive doctrine—is tremendously
important. Discourses that emphasize the content of our substantive tax
rules as discrete phenomena have too long been privileged over discourses
analyzing the underlying relationships that facilitate the use and abuse of
these rules. Furthermore, underlying assumptions that we bring to the table
may lull us into believing that we are aware of these relationships and are
adequately considering and assessing their impacts. Unfortunately, the
opposite is true. Since relationships between legal persons are the ―life
blood‖ that allows tax consequence-generating transactions to occur at all,
it is imperative that such relationships—and our present approaches toward
them—be confronted and interrogated in full.

